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INTRODUCTION
Man is the builder of a historical edifice: the House of man. He is
the brick and the firm foundation of his own project and also the
goal for whom the House is being constructed. . . .Man is the
player and the cards; he is at stake but he repeats with Oedipus: "I
will search out the truth."
-Marcel Pallais Checa1
After they had explored all the suns in the universe, and all the
planets of all the suns, they realized that there was no other life in
the universe, and that they were alone. And they were very happy,
because then they knew it was up to them to become all the things
they had imagined they would find.
-Lanford Wilson2
What shall we do and how shall we live? According to Plato and
Tolstoy and other reliable observers, this is our most important question. 3
We should not trust any philosophy that makes this question appear fool-
ish. Nihilism is such a philosophy: Its answer to the question of how we
should live is that it does not matter-"just anything goes."'4 Because ni-
hilism gives this answer to our most important question, John Irving has
rightly said that nihilism is "a religion . . vastly lacking in seriousness."
'5
1. M. Pallais Checa, Sketches on Hegel's Science iv (June 1977) (unpublished manuscript on file
in Sawyer Library at Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.).
2. L. WILSON, 5TH OF JULY 127 (1978).
3. "Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important
to us: 'What shall we do and how shall we live?"' W. RUNCIMAN, SOCIAL SCIE.NCE AND POLITCAL
THEORY 156 (2d ed. 1969) (quoting Leo Tolstoy).
You are mistaken, my friend, if you think that a man who is worth anything ought to spend
his time weighing up the prospects of life and death. He has only one thing to consider in
performing any action; that is, whether he is acting rightly or wrongly, like a good man or a
bad one.
PLATO, The Apology, in THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 59 (H. Tredennick trans. 1969).
4. M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LiMrrs OF JUSTICE 176 (1982).
Nihilism may be used in a somewhat different sense to describe an extreme pessimism that doubts
that life means anything or that anything good is possible.
At last the cold crept up my spine; at last it filled me from foot to head; at last I grew so
chill and desolate that all thought and pain and awareness came to a standstill. I wasn't miser-
able anymore: I wasn't anything at all. I was a nothing-a random configuration of molecules.
If my heart still beat I didn't know it. I was aware of one thing only: next to the gaping fact
called Death, all I knew was nothing, all I did meant nothing, all I felt conveyed nothing. This
was no passing thought. It was a gnawing, palpable emptiness more real than the cold. I was a
hollow, meaningless nothing, entranced on a rock in a fog.
D. DUNCAN, THE RIVER WHY 112 (1983).
5. J. IRVING, THE HOTEL NEW HAMPSHIRE 231 (1981). I am using the term "nihilism" in a
pejorative sense. This is deliberate; I could just as easily have called myself a "nihilist" and given the
term a positive, laudatory meaning. When words are as abstract and uncommon as "nihilism," it is
possible to make such choices.
There are advantages and disadvantages to appropriating a label placed on you by your adversaries,
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Recently, there has been a lot of talk among legal scholars about nihil-
ism.' This has been more evident in conversations among law professors
than in the scholarly literature. When references to nihilism do appear in
the law journals, they are vague and generally made only in passing.
Nonetheless, nihilism is a central issue of contemporary legal theory.
As I will use it, nihilism has both an epistemological and a moral com-
ponent.7 As a theory of knowledge, nihilism claims that it is impossible to
say anything true about the world. No one can properly claim to describe
the world accurately: Anything anyone says is as likely to be wrong as it
is to be right, and anything is as likely to be right or wrong as anything
else. If one takes nihilism seriously, it is impossible, or in any event fruit-
less, to describe the world; all possible descriptions are equally invalid
because we cannot be sure that any description is reliable.
As a theory of morality, nihilism claims that there is no meaningful
way to decide how to live a good life. Any action may be described as
right or wrong, good or bad. Just as there is no objective way to describe
any action, there is no objective way to decide how to act. Because all
actions that we think are good are just as likely to be bad, we have no
rational way to decide what to do. Since we cannot know what to do, it
does not matter what we do.'
even when they intend that label to be insulting. The main disadvantage is that use of such a label
often confuses issues. Thus, nihilism, as the word is now used in legal debates, may not mean what
nihilism has traditionally meant. See infra note 7. The advantages, however, can be significant. Ap-
propriating such a label can drive home the difference between your views and the views of others by
emphasizing the extent to which you reject their criteria for judging what is and is not praiseworthy.
What they consider an insult, you consider a compliment. Moreover, terms of rejection and vilification
can sometimes become useful rallying cries to organize opposition to established practices. Mark
Tushnet understood this when he gave the word "nihilism" its first usage in an article on the Critical
Legal Studies movement. Championing the movement, he gave the term "nihilism" a more laudatory
meaning than I am giving it here, see Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpreta-
tion of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 T.x. L. REv. 1307, 1340-59 (1979) (defining
nihilism as belief that no consistent principles unify legal reasoning or formulation and application of
legal rules, and arguing that we must go beyond nihilism to invent language for expressing conflicting
values and discussing prescriptive choices).
6. See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 741 (1982) ("The nihilist
would argue that for any text-particularly such a comprehensive text as the Constitution-there are
any number of possible meanings, that interpretation consists of choosing one of those meanings, and
that in this selection process the judge will inevitably express his own values. All law is masked
power."); Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1061, 1063-64 (arguing that those skeptical
about the possibility of moral statements being true or false-rather than merely good or bad, accept-
able or unacceptable-have no firm psychological basis for their beliefs and are in danger of becoming
nihilists who lack any convictions).
7. I am not trying to use the word nihilism in the way philosophers have used it. Those philo-
sophical discussions are irrelevant to the current debates among legal theorists about "nihilism," see
supra notes 5 & 6; none of those theorists (myself included) has paid much attention to that literature,
at least not in print. In part, I wrote this Article in order to discuss what "nihilism" means in the
context of this debate and to elaborate upon what I think the issues in the debate are.
8. I distinguish nihilism both from what I call rationalism and from my own position, which I
prefer not to label but which for clarity's sake I will here call irrationalism, after Clare Dalton's use
of that term in Dalton, Book Review, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 229 (1983) (reviewing THE PoLMCS
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The issues raised by the Critical Legal Studies movement have brought
nihilism to center stage. Those of us associated with Critical Legal Studies
believe that law is not apolitical and objective: Lawyers, judges, and schol-
ars make highly controversial political choices, but use the ideology of le-
gal reasoning to make our institutions appear natural and our rules ap-
pear neutral. This view of the legal system raises the possibility that there
are no rational, objective criteria that can govern how we describe that
system, or how we choose governmental institutions, or how we make le-
gal decisions. Critical Legal Studies thus raises the specter of nihilism.
So far, Critical Legal Scholars have focused on three topics. First, we
have demonstrated in a variety of contexts that law varies according to
time and place, and that this historical and social contingency applies to
legal reasoning, legal rules, and governmental and social institutions.9 Sec-
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982)). Rationalism encompasses two fundamen-
tal assumptions, neither of which I accept. The rationalist believes that a rational foundation and
method are necessary, both epistemologically and psychologically, to develop legitimate commitment to
moral values; she also believes that such a rational foundation and method either already exist or can
be discovered or invented. Nihilism is only a partial rejection of rationalism: The nihilist rejects the
second assumption, but not the first. Thus a nihilist would argue that a rational foundation is neces-
sary to sustain values but that no such foundation exists or can be identified. This sort of nihilism
leads directly to psychological feelings of impotence and despair, and to the sense that nothing matters,
because what we desperately require to make our lives meaningful is impossible to achieve. My posi-
tion rejects both assumptions. We do not have a rational foundation and method for legal or moral
reasoning (in the sense that traditional legal theorists imagine such rational foundations to be possi-
ble); we do not, however, need such a foundation or method to develop passionate commitments and to
make our lives meaningful. This formulation removes the dilemma that is the basis for the despair of
the middle position. I prefer not to describe my position as "irrationalism"-except for the purposes
of this footnote-for the same reason I decline to adopt nihilism as a way to describe myself. It would
be misleading and confusing to appear to be advocating that decisions be made "irration-
ally"-without connection with discernable goals. A better term might be pragmatism. See R. RORTY,
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 160-75 (1982). I would prefer, as would Mark Tushnet and Rich-
ard Bernstein and Gerald Frug, that we stop thinking about moral, political, and legal choice in terms
of the dichotomies between reason and emotion, law and politics, rationality and irrationality, objec-
tivism and relativism. These dichotomies are inadequate to express the dilemmas of social life. See R.
BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS, 1-49,
223-31 (1983); Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276,
1291-92 (1984).
9. I do not intend this tripartite division of Critical Legal Studies to be comprehensive. At the
same time, the categories are not mutually exclusive; many articles could be placed in all three catego-
ries. See, e.g., R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976) (describing different legal systems prev-
alent in different societies); Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1057 (1980)
(describing history of different legal conceptions of the municipality); Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981) (describing techniques used by legal scholars to hide from
themselves and others the historical and social contingency of law); Kennedy, The Structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979) (describing transition from feudal to modem
liberal conceptions of law); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (describing changes in
legal thought in twentieth century); Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 325 (1980) (describing chang-
ing conceptions of property rights over the course of the nineteenth century); Note, Tortious Interfer-
ence with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Con-
tract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1980) (describing changing conceptions of torts, property,
and contracts); Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology (Book Review), 33 STAN. L. REV. 753
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ond, we have shown that legal reasoning is indeterminate and
contradictory.1" By its own criteria, legal reasoning cannot resolve legal
questions in an "objective" manner; nor can it explain how the legal sys-
tem works or how judges decide cases. Third, we have argued that law is
not neutral: It is a mechanism for creating and legitimating configurations
of economic and political power. We have done this by exploring the rela-
tion over time between the legal system and the social structure."
This scholarship has undermined the traditional idea that legal reason-
ing is an objective and rational way to decide what rules and institutions
we should have. We have proposed instead that legal reasoning is a way
of simultaneously articulating and masking political and moral
commitment.
The custodians of traditional legal theory have reacted to Critical Legal
Studies by suggesting that it embraces nihilism. And these opponents of
Critical Legal Studies are not alone; many otherwise sympathetic law stu-
dents, lawyers, and legal scholars share that view."2 The charge of nihil-
ism is the most superficially plausible-and therefore the most rhetorically
powerful-complaint against those of us who maintain that law is a kind
of politics.
If it is true that legal reasoning is indeterminate or otherwise incoher-
(1981) (describing history of concept of freedom of contract). See generally Kennedy & Klare, A
Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. (1984) (forthcoming).
10. See, e.g., Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 591 (1981) (identifying contradictory assumptions underlying criminal law); Kennedy, Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981) (identifying the
assumptions underlying theories that purport to identify efficient legal rules and arguing that changes
in those assumptions multiply the number of efficient solutions to any given problem); Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976) (describing the contra-
dictory principles of individualism versus altruism and formality versus informality that pervade legal
argumentation); Singer, Catcher in the Rye Jurisprudence, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 275 (1983) (arguing
that prevalent conceptions of judicial role are indeterminate and internally contradictory); Singer, The
Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975
(arguing that legal theories based on developing the implications of rights are indeterminate and inter-
nally contradictory); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivismn and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (arguing that leading themes of constitutional law
can be made determinate only by adopting assumptions that contradict basic premises underlying
those theories); Dalton, supra note 8 (describing the irrationalist school of Critical Legal Studies);
Mensch, supra note 9 (arguing that idea of freedom of contract is incoherent on its own terms).
11. See, e.g., M. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977) (le-
gal rules changed over time to subsidize economic development and to promote class interests); C.
MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979) (legal system has helped create
and reinforce the social, economic, and sexual subordination of women by tolerating that subordina-
tion and falling to provide remedies for sexual harassment); R. UNGER, supra note 9 (exploring the
relation between law and different social structures); Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor
Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REv. 55 (1979) (social and legal barriers operating
against the successful participation of parents in the labor market primarily disadvantage women);
Minow, The Properties of Family and the Families of Property (Book Review), 92 YALE L.J. 376
(1982) (discussing the relations between law and social structure, including family and employment).
12. E.g., Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done (Book Review), 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1466, 1470-72 (1983).
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ent, and that its claims to objectivity are false, then we face two problems.
On an individual level, the question is how can we know what we should
do and how we should live. What makes one person's values better than
anyone else's values? If it is impossible to discover or invent objective cri-
teria for determining what people should and should not be allowed to do
to each other, how is it possible to live a good life? And if all theories of
morality and law are historically contingent, and all values are relative to
time and place, how can we develop passionate moral commitments?
On a social level, the question is whether it is possible to set up a legal
system based on the rule of law. If legal reasoning is internally contradic-
tory and therefore indeterminate, there are no objective limits on what
judges or other governmental officials can do. Thus the goal of con-
straining government or regulating interpersonal conduct by previously
knowable general rules seems impossible. Is the realm of judicial action,
then, inevitably governed by whim and caprice?
A philosophical problem is the "product of the unconscious adoption of
assumptions built into the vocabulary in which the problem [is]
stated-assumptions which [must] be questioned before the problem itself
[can be] taken seriously." 13 Traditional legal theory (what others have
called "liberal legalism") 1 is based on certain fundamental assumptions
13. R. RoRTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE xiii (1979). A great deal of my
argument here constitutes an application of Rorty's views of philosophy to legal reasoning. Rorty's
book is brilliant, and I recommend it highly. My own ability to express my dissatisfaction with tradi-
tional legal theory crystallized after reading Rorty, and I have cited him liberally throughout this
Article.
14. See Klare, supra note 9, at 276. By referring to "traditional legal theory," I am painting with
an extremely broad brush. As I see it, there are currently three basic schools of traditional legal theory
and two major schools of criticism. The traditional schools of legal theory are (1) positivism, repre-
sented mainly by H.L.A. Hart, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); (2) rights theory,
including consensus theorists such as Ronald Dworkin, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY (1977), and Bruce Ackerman, see B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980), and social contract theorists such as John Rawls, see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971), and Robert Nozick, see R. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); and (3) law and
economics, represented by Richard Posner, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed.
1977); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981), and many others. The critical schools are
(1) feminism, represented by Catharine MacKinnon, see C. MAcKINNON, supra note 11; MacKin-
non, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence (Book Review), 34 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1982); Frances Olsen,
see Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1497 (1983); and many others; and (2) Critical Legal Studies, represented by Duncan Kennedy,
Robert Gordon, Mark Tushnet, Clare Dalton and others, see supra notes 5, 8, 9 & 10.
In this Article, when I use the term "traditional legal theorists," I am thinking principally of the
rights theorists and, somewhat more peripherally, the law and economics writers. In addition, because
all judges write judicial opinions in a way that purports to "apply" the law in a relatively uncon-
troversial fashion or purports to decide unclear cases by a process of legal reasoning that is capable of
generating answers, I count them among the traditional legal theorists.
Positivists, unlike members of the other schools, do not purport to describe a method for determin-
ing what the content of the legal rules should be; rather, they offer a general description of the role of
law in society. Criticisms of law and economics theories require more detail than I can provide here.
For critiques of those theories, see Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 769; Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv.
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that require its proponents to find, or at least to search for, determinate,
objective, and neutral decision procedures. Traditional theorists assert that
these procedures ground the legal system on a foundation that is rational,
objective, and apolitical, and that therefore transcends conflicts of individ-
ual interests or values.1 5 To claim that there is no such ground seems to
endanger both the possibility of normative discourse and the rule of law
itself.1 6 The issue of nihilism is really a dispute over this fundamental
premise: that reason can adjudicate value conflicts and that it is both pos-
sible and necessary to justify legal rules and institutions on the basis of
determinate and objective decision procedures.
Rather than explain how we can reform legal theory to solve the prob-
lem of nihilism, I will explain why I do not think there is a problem. I
will argue for a conception of legal reasoning that is divorced from the
search for certainty. I will not demonstrate that the traditional goal is
false or irrational. I will merely explain why I refuse to attempt the sort
of explanation of legal rules that relies on the assumptions of determinacy,
objectivity, and neutrality. In my view, the proper goal of legal theory is
precisely the opposite of that articulated by the traditional view. Legal
theory should "edify," that is, it should "help . . . readers, or society as a
whole, break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes, rather than
. . .provide 'grounding' for the intuitions and customs of the present."
' 7
Law and morality have no rational foundation that once and for all
compels all persons to prefer certain institutions and rules above all
others. Nor is there a politically neutral and dispassionate method of deci-
sionmaking that can be justified on the grounds of its rationality. The
purpose of this Article is to explain why the absence of determinacy, ob-
jectivity, and neutrality does not condemn us to indifference or arbitrari-
ness, nor make it ridiculous to ask, or impossible to answer, the question
669 (1979); Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique of the Core Premises of Lau, and
Economics, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 274 (1983); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:
A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Effi-
cient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711 (1980). Adherents of the law and economics movement share with
rights theorists the fundamental assumptions of what I have called rationalism, see supra note 8. They
both assume that we need to describe a rational method that will constitute a decision procedure and
help us figure out what to do. Moreover, they both assume that rational exegesis can demonstrate the
legitimacy of such a method.
Because my critique is at such a fundamental level, it is possible to criticize at once competing
schools of thought, and both theorists and judges. While I will illustrate my argument with citations to
various legal theorists, these citations are not meant to be exhaustive; nor will they demonstrate that
my general description of traditional legal theory is a fully accurate description of any particular
theorist or judge. By encompassing a wide range of theorists and judges, my argument is designed to
clarify the debate about the nature of legal reasoning.
15. Cf M. SANDEL, supra note 4, at 2, 116-18, 154-61 (discussing priority of the right over the
good); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 564-73 (1983) (pointing
out and criticizing these characteristics of traditional legal theory).
16. See R. RoRTv, supra note 13, at 316-17; Unger, supra note 15, at 576.
17. R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 12.
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of what we should do or how we should live. The lack of a rational foun-
dation to legal reasoning does not prevent us from developing passionate
moral and political commitments. On the contrary, it liberates us to em-
brace them.
In this Article, I will talk about why traditional legal theory has failed
us, and how, in light of that failure, we can imagine new ways to live
together. In Part I, I will describe the claim that legal doctrine is indeter-
minate. Despite claims by their adherents to the contrary, our prevalent
legal theories cannot guide us in deciding what legal rules to enforce or
how to apply them once we have chosen them. In Part II, I will argue
that the ways in which traditional legal theorists seek to ground the legal
system on a rational foundation are illegitimate: Attempts to demonstrate
that legal theories are true or grounded in reality are attempts to turn
discretionary normative statements into non-discretionary descriptions.
Part III will discuss the claim of traditional legal theorists that law can
and should be neutral. Advocates of neutrality fail to acknowledge that the
principles we use to justify legal rules are not and cannot be based on
considerations completely independent of our views of the good life.
Part IV will explain why traditional legal theorists have sought to
ground the legal system on determinate, objective, and neutral decision
procedures. These theorists believe that law requires a rational foundation
in order to avoid both tyranny and arbitrariness. Their fears are unjusti-
fied. In Part V, I will argue that we should view legal theory as a form of
political activity, rather than as radically distinct from politics. Finally, in
Part VI, I will argue that the greatest problems we face are cruelty, mis-
ery, hierarchy, and loneliness. Those issues should be at the center of any
consideration of what we should do and how we should live.
I. DETERMINACY
These principles are the principles of social justice: they provide a
way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society
and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and bur-
dens of social cooperation.
-John Rawls18
A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to ac-
cept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to
amend.
-Nelson Goodman19
18. J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 4.
19. N. GOODMAN, FACr, FICTION, AND FORECAST 64 (4th ed. 1983) (original italicized).
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A. Internal Critique
Everyone is confused about what Critical Legal Scholars mean when
we say that law or rights or legal theory is indeterminate. The claim that
legal theory is infinitely manipulable expresses a universal experience of
lawyers;2° at the same time, it seems to be contradicted by the ability of
experienced litigators and court watchers often to predict with surprising
accuracy what judges are going to do. If legal reasoning does not deter-
mine the outcomes, what does? And if that something else determines out-
comes, why isn't that just legal reasoning by another name?
Two points must be made at the outset about the character of the claim
that law is indeterminate. First, it is an empirical claim about existing
legal theories and arguments. It is not a claim that it is impossible to
invent determinate theories. It is also not a claim about the nature of rea-
son or the human mind or anything like that. Rather, it is a description of
the arguments and theories that are currently used by judges and scholars
to justify outcomes and rules.
21
Second, it is an internal critique. This is a critique from within, a cri-
tique that uses the premises of traditional legal theory against itself. Legal
scholars and judges claim that the theories or arguments they develop nec-
essarily lead to certain results, or at least define a narrow range of alter-
natives and thus severely constrain the possible outcomes. We take these
claims seriously and examine them to see if they are true. When Rawls
22
or Nozick23 or Ackerman2 4 invents a theory of justice, or Ely 5 invents a
theory of constitutional adjudication, or Radin21 invents a theory of prop-
erty, or Posner 27 invents a theory of efficiency, they each claim to have
found or invented a small set of general principles that can be applied in
many specific instances to tell us what sort of institutions and rules we
should have. If we agree with their general premises, they argue, then we
must logically favor such and such institutions or such and such rules. My
contention that their theories do not determine the outcomes that they pro-
pose falsifies a claim that they themselves have made.28
20. Unger, supra note 15, at 570.
21. The claim that legal theory is indeterminate is a descriptive claim. Traditional theorists usu-
ally claim that their theories are determinate in the sense that they help us decide what the legal rules
are or should be. They also claim that theories should be determinate because theories that leave the
judge free to choose what to do allow judges to act arbitrarily and therefore do not sufficiently con-
strain the exercise of governmental power.
22. J. RAWIS, supra note 14.
23. R. NOZICK, supra note 14.
24. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 14.
25. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT (1980).
26. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
27. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 14.
28. I do not mean that these theorists claim that their theories provide the answer to every legal
question. All these theorists carefully carve out areas of uncertainty or indeterminacy as integral parts
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Indeterminacy is a claim about legal doctrine. "Doctrine" is an ambigu-
ous term that includes both legal rules and arguments. Legal rules or
standards govern the relations among individuals and organizations, be-
tween those persons and various governmental bodies, and among the gov-
ernmental bodies themselves. Legal theories, arguments, or principles are
justifications for or criticisms of alternative rules. Depending on how they
are treated, general principles may be described either as rules or argu-
ments. If those principles are used to justify the result directly, they are
being used as rules; if they support more specific rules or standards which
are said to determine the result, they are being used as arguments.
A legal theory or a legal rule is determinate if it tells us what to do. A
completely determinate theory or rule will leave us no choice; a relatively
determinate theory or rule will constrain our choices, more or less nar-
rowly, within boundaries. The claim that a legal doctrine is indeterminate
means that the doctrine allows choice rather than constraining or compel-
ling it.
It is easy to create completely determinate legal rules and arguments.
For example, an absolutely determinate private law system could be based
on the rule that no one is liable to anyone else for anything and that
everyone is free to do whatever she wants without government interfer-
ence. Relentless application of this rule would produce a state-of-nature
legal system that would be fully determinate: The plaintiff would always
lose. The problem is that this or any other determinate system bears no
relation to anything anyone would consider to be just or legitimate. The
reason is obvious. We cannot accept such a system because it would not
protect other important, competing values-security, privacy, reputation,
freedom of movement. We invent more complicated rule systems to accom-
modate our contradictory values. Thus, in our current way of thinking
about law, we have to draw lines between principles and counter-
principles, determine the scope of existing rules, and decide whether to
change the rules.
Traditional legal theory therefore incorporates both determinacy and
of their theories. Nonetheless, each claims that his or her theory will help judges make decisions about
what the legal rules should be. Those rules will limit the number of available alternatives in a way
that will constrain choices within certain boundaries, see H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 132-37
(law is framework of general, determinate rules with pockets of indeterminacy that allow discretion-
ary choice by judges), or they will constrain choice by limiting the kinds of reasons judges can offer for
their decisions, see, e.g., B. AcKERMAN, supra note 14, at 3-12 (describing the principles that should
constrain discourse about rules decisions); R. DwoRKIN, supra note 14, at 81-130 (judicial decisions
in hard cases should be made on basis of arguments of principle rather than of policy); see also J.
RAWLS, supra note 14, at 4 ("[T]he principles of social justice. . . provide a way of assigning rights
and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the bene-
fits and burdens of social cooperation."); Radin, supra note 26, at 958 (her theory of property rights
"can help decide specific disputes between rival claimants").
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indeterminacy," For example, H.L.A. Hart asserts that the legal rules in
force dictate the result in many "plain cases,' '3 0 or "paradigm, clear
cases."3 1 He acknowledges, however, that: "In every legal system a large
and important field is left open for the exercise of discretion by courts and
other officials in rendering initially vague standards determinate, in
resolving the uncertainties of statutes, or in developing and qualifying
rules only broadly communicated by authoritative precedents." 2 Simi-
larly, Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between easy cases and hard cases.3 3
Nonetheless, Dworkin claims to have identified a "technique" of adjudica-
tion 4 that will aid judges in deciding which legal rules to apply in hard
cases.3 5 At the same time, Dworkin claims that his theory recognizes the
possibility of disagreements; his theory involves decisions of "political con-
viction about which reasonable men disagree"3' 6 and is not intended to be
applied mechanically.3" Thus, his theory carefully attempts to allow some
amount of indeterminacy.
8s
Determinacy is necessary to the ideology of the rule of law, for both
theorists and judges. It is the only way judges can appear to apply the law
rather than make it. Determinate rules and arguments are desirable be-
cause they restrain arbitrary judicial power. At the same time, determi-
nacy is threatening. A completely determinate set of rules would require
judges to apply existing rules mechanically even in unforeseen circum-
stances where the policy underlying the rule might not apply. Adopting a
completely determinate set of rules would therefore substitute one form of
29. See J. RAwLs, supra note 14, at 10 (defining a "concept of justice" as a way of "assigning
rights and duties and . . . defining the appropriate division of social advantages"). Rawls further
explains:
No doubt any conception of justice will have to rely on intuition to some degree. Nevertheless,
we should do what we can to reduce the direct appeal to our considered judgments. For if men
balance final principles differently, as presumably they often do, then their conceptions of
justice are different. The assignment of weights is an essential and not a minor part of a
conception of justice. If we cannot explain how these weights are to be determined by reasona-
ble ethical criteria, the means of rational discussion have come to an end. An intuitionist con-
ception of justice is, one might say, but half a conception. We should do what we can to
formulate explicit principles for the priority problem, even though the dependence on intuition
cannot be eliminated entirely.
Id. at 41.
30. H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 123.
31. Id. at 125.
32. Id. at 132.
33. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 127 (discussing "clear cases"); id. at 83 (discussing
"hard case[s]").
34. Id. at 81-130.
35. Id. at 130.
36. Id. at 123.
37. Id. at 81.
38. I am reminded of the comment of the philosopher in Douglas Adams' The Hitchhiker's Guide
to the Galaxy: "'That's right,' shouted Vroomfondel, 'we demand rigidly defined areas of doubt and
uncertainty!"' D. ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 172 (1979).
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arbitrariness (over- and under-inclusiveness of rules) for another (over-
broad discretion)."
Indeterminacy, like determinacy, is both desirable and threatening. It is
desirable because it allows judges, in generating or applying rules, and
juries, in applying flexible standards like due care, to appeal directly to
their intuition and fit the law to particular situations. This power accords
with our sense that individuals should have justice done in their particular
cases. At the same time, indeterminacy is threatening because it appears to
allow judges and juries too much discretion.
Thus, legal theories and sets of rules incorporate both determinacy and
indeterminacy. Those who fashion them want us to believe that we have
the right mix: We have each to the extent that it is desirable but not to the
extent that it is threatening. As Hart argues:
In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between two
social needs: the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of
conduct, safely be applied by private individuals to themselves with-
out fresh official guidance or weighing up of social issues, and the
need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official
choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled
when they arise in a concrete case.' °
Legal doctrine-rules and theories-incorporates both rigid rules and
flexible standards, general principles and particular principles.
While traditional legal theorists acknowledge the inevitability and de-
sirability of some indeterminacy, traditional legal theory requires a rela-
tively large amount of determinacy as a fundamental premise of the rule
of law.41 Our legal system, however, has never satisfied this goal. The
39. Kennedy, Fonn and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1689
(1976) (rigid rules require "the sacrifice of precision in the achievement of the objectives lying behind
the rules"). See H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 126-27 ("We shall be forced by this technique to
include in the scope of a rule cases which we would wish to exclude in order to give effect to reasona-
ble social aims, and which the open textured terms of our language would have allowed us to exclude,
had we left them less rigidly defined.").
40. H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 127.
41. Id. at 121 ("If it were not possible to communicate general standards of conduct, which multi-
tudes of individuals could understand, without further direction, as requiring from them certain con-
duct when occasion arose, nothing that we now recognize as law could exist."); id. at 132-37 (arguing
that public officials and private citizens are largely guided by determinate legal rules, with uncertainty
existing only at margins or interstices of legal system); R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 5 ("a judicial
decision is fairer if it represents the application of established standards rather than the imposition of
new ones"); id. at 81 ("It remains the judge's duty, even in hard cases, to discover what the rights of
the parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively."); J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 235:
A legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the purpose
of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for social cooperation. When these
rules are just they establish a basis for legitimate expectations. They constitute grounds upon
which persons can rely on one another and rightly object when their expectations are not
fulfilled. If the bases of these claims are unsure, so are the boundaries of men's liberties.
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critique advanced by certain Critical Legal Scholars is that neither the
theories proposed by the theorists, nor the arguments used by judges to
justify their decisions, nor the legal rules in force are as determinate as
traditional theorists and judges claim. This is an empirical question, and
its truth depends on specific demonstrations of how individual theories or
rules fail to provide determinate resolutions of competing principles.
42
Theorists and judges are almost always mistaken when they claim that
they have discovered a set of arguments that, by itself, provides the requi-
site amount of determinacy for the legal system. Legal doctrine is far more
indeterminate than traditional theorists realize it is. If traditional legal
theorists are correct about the importance of determinacy to the rule of
law, then-by their own criteria-the rule of law has never existed any-
where. This is the real bite of the critique.
B. Why Legal Doctrine Does Not Compel Our Choices
A legal theory or set of legal rules is completely determinate if it is
comprehensive, consistent, directive and self-revising. Any doctrine or set
of rules that fails to satisfy any one of these requirements is indeterminate
because it does not fully constrain our choices. I will discuss each of these
qualities in turn.
1. Comprehensive. A legal theory or set of rules is comprehensive if
it covers all fact situations. Legal theories may be incomplete in several
ways. First, a theory or set of rules may have limited scope. Theories of
justice, such as those of Rawls, Nozick, Ackerman, and Dworkin, and
theories of efficiency, such as that of Posner, are comprehensive in the
sense that they purport to apply to all or almost all fact situations. These
theorists claim that their theories can guide judges in most situations.43
Other theories, such as Radin's theory of property, 44 purport to apply
only to specific segments of the legal system. To the extent such theories
do not cover certain fact situations, they cannot determine judicial deci-
sions in those areas.
See also R. UNGER, supra note 9, at 176-77 ("In the broadest sense, the rule of law is defined by the
interrelated notions of neutrality, uniformity, and predictability. Governmental power must be exer-
cised within the constraints of rules that apply to ample categories of persons and acts, and these
rules, whatever they may be, must be uniformly applied.").
42. This Article is not intended to demonstrate that traditional legal theory is indeterminate, but
only to clarify the nature of the Critical Legal critique of that theory. For a detailed discussion of how
certain classical analytical jurists profferred indeterminate theories, see Singer, The Legal Rights De-
bate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Holfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975; see also M.
SANDEL, supra note 4, at 104-32 (critiquing Rawls).
43. Those theorists do not pretend that their theories give determinate solutions in ever fact
situation. Each theory encompasses a certain amount of indeterminacy. Nonetheless, each the-
ory-determinate or indeterminate-is intended to be generally applicable, as opposed to a theory that
deals, for example, only with ownership of tangible objects.
44. Radin, supra note 26.
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Second, the legal rules in force may contain gaps. Cases of first impres-
sion are cases that appear to be so different from any decided cases that
they are not covered by any existing rule. Such cases occur far more fre-
qpaently than most theorists imagine. They not only occur when there are
no sufficiently specific rules to provide a result in a given case, but also
when no precedent exists in the jurisdiction that is to decide the issue.
Legal scholars create seemingly comprehensive bodies of law, such as con-
tracts, torts, or property, by gleaning decisions from many states. Many of
the basic rules of law described in law treatises or casebooks have been
established in only some jurisdictions. These treatises, as well as the vari-
ous Restatements, seek to influence judges in all jurisdictions to adopt ba-
sic rules that are accepted in other jurisdictions. Thus, when the highest
court of a state addresses a basic rule of contracts, such as a rule about
consideration, and that court has not rendered a definitive decision in the
past, it is free to adopt or reject the law of other jurisdictions.
Third, arguments addressed to specific issues may not decide other is-
sues. Judges and legal scholars present arguments to justify their choice of
certain rules over others. The number of possible rules, however, is infi-
nite. Any choice between two or three structured alternatives is greatly
constricted. Even if we can come up with an argument or theory that can
choose definitively among a small set of alternatives, we still have not
ruled out other possibilities. For example, if we are choosing between
strict liability and negligence standards for injuries caused by faulty auto-
mobile repairs, we can give a set of rights and utility arguments for adopt-
ing a strict liability test and a different set of arguments for adopting a
negligence test. However the discussion turns out, we have still not dis-
cussed the countless other possibilities, such as universal car repair insur-
ance or the abolition of cars altogether and reliance on mass transport.
2. Consistent. If legal theories and rules are internally contradictory
or inconsistent, they cannot determine our choices. Nonetheless, contradic-
tion is a common characteristic of legal doctrine. First, when we choose
among a small list of candidates, the arguments we typically advance to
decide among alternative legal rules turn out to be contradictory. In other
words, all of us accept certain arguments in some situations and reject
those same arguments in other situations.45 This characteristic applies
45. For example, in Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220 (1815), the defendant, a property owner
on Beacon Hill in Boston, excavated his land in order to construct a building. In doing so, he removed
the lateral support for the plaintiff's land, causing some of the plaintiff's soil to cave in on defendant's
land and also causing plaintiff's house to subside. Writing for the court, Chief Justice Parker treated
the case as involving two questions, for which he gave inconsistent answers. First, the court asked
whether the plaintiff had a right of lateral support for his soil requiring that the defendant excavate
so as to maintain lateral support. The answer was yes: The plaintiff had a right to have his soil
supported in its natural condition because he had a right of security not to have his property injured
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1, 1984
both to rights theories and utilitarianism. The metatheories that have been
proposed to resolve the contradictions are hopelessly vague, ambiguous, or
themselves internally contradictory. Nothing tells us conclusively when to
accept and when to reject a particular argument.
The internal contradictions in our metatheories sometimes take the
form of rules with exceptions or of principles with limiting counter-
principles. Because the line between the rule and the exception or the
principle and the counterprinciple may be moved, we require a metatheo-
ry at a higher level of generality to tell us where to draw the line. At
other times our metatheories take the form of highly ambiguous, abstract
concepts, like freedom, equality, privacy, democracy, or property, which
themselves in our current discourse mean contradictory things. Terms like
these hide the underlying contradiction by their convenient vagueness. In
both of these situations, we require a metatheory that can tell us precisely
how we are to choose between the available alternatives. In the absence of
such a metatheory, we are left free to choose between the contradictory
principles. The arguments therefore do not determine the result.4
by the acts of his neighbor; the defendant was not legally free to use his property in a way that
injured the plaintiff's property. Id. at 223. Second, the court asked whether the defendant had a duty
to provide lateral support for the weight of plaintiff's house. The answer was no: The plaintiff had no
right to be secure from having his neighbor excavate his own land in such a way as to cause plaintiff's
house to fall down; plaintiff had the right of support for the soil only and the defendant was legally
free to excavate on his own land in such a way as to provide only such support as plaintiff's soil
would have required in its natural condition and was free not to provide support for the weight of
plaintiff's house.
On the first issue, the court accepted the argument that plaintiff had a right to security and rejected
defendant's argument that he had a right of freedom of action; on the second issue, the court rejected
the plaintiff's argument that he had a right to security and accepted defendant's argument that he had
a right of freedom of action. The court advanced no metatheoretical explanation for this contradiction.
Arguments based on social utility lead to a similar contradiction. Defendant's argument for al-
lowing him to excavate without either compensating plaintiff for removing lateral support or provid-
ing precautions against the removal of such support is the argument that freedom of action stirs
economic development. Allowing property owners in the city to build houses without having to worry
about the consequences of such construction on their neighbor's property stimulates construction. The
counter-argument is that unless property owners know that the law protects the value of their invest-
ment against injury by their neighbors, they will have no incentive to invest in construction. Security,
rather than freedom of action, promotes investment and stimulates economic development. See Ken-
nedy, supra note 9, at 358-60.
46. For example, John Stuart Mill offered a metatheory intended to draw a line between rights of
freedom of action and rights of security. This was the metatheory of self-regarding acts: You have a
legal liberty to do anything that legitimately concerns only yourself, but you cannot do anything that
harms others. See Singer, supra note 42, at 995-99. This categorization cannot withstand scrutiny.
Mill argued, for example, that alcohol consumption was a self-regarding act and could not be legiti-
mately prohibited. Id. at 996-97. In this age of crackdowns on drunk drivers, it is easy to see that
alcohol consumption is not necessarily a self-regarding act. In fact, any action that some people might
consider self-regarding might be viewed by others as other-regarding. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942) (growing wheat on one's own land for home consumption affects interstate
commerce). The metatheory therefore fails to generate determinate solutions to legal questions.
Mill also created an exception allowing harmful other-regarding acts if allowing such acts would
maximize social welfare. See Singer, supra note 42, at 998. This metatheory was intended to reconcile
the contradictory principles of freedom and security, but it failed to accomplish this goal. The manip-
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Second, rules may be indeterminate because of conflicts. A logical con-
tradiction between two rules means that the rules are specific enough for
there to be general agreement that they apply to a particular case, yet at
the same time the two rules require opposite results. For example, a logi-
cal contradiction exists between the rules: (1) anyone over eighteen years
old may vote, and (2) only people over twenty-one years old may vote.
47
A logical contradiction between two rules must be distinguished from a
contradiction between two principles. Principles that are too general to be
treated as rules are offered as justifications for specific legal rules. Princi-
ples that tell us to do opposite things create a contradiction of policy or
principle. For example, there is a contradiction between the principle that
people should have freedom to do whatever they like to pursue happiness
and the counterprinciple that freedom of action should be limited so that
people will not do anything that harms others. If these principles are
stated in their absolute form, they create a logical contradiction because
they cannot both be true at the same time. If they are not intended to be
absolute, then they are competing general principles between which a
line-the legal rule-must be drawn. 8
Third, rules at varying levels of generality cause indeterminacy. Even if
a specific rule exists that has no exceptions and that everyone agrees how
to apply, such as "one must be at least eighteen years old to vote in gov-
ernmental elections," there is always a more general rule or principle that
could plausibly be used to nullify it, such as equal protection of the
laws.49 This is true even if everyone agrees that the general principle does
not apply to that particular rule. This is because use of the general princi-
ple to nullify the specific rule would represent a plausible, although un-
conventional, legal justification for the result.
The availability of general principles, whether of constitutional or of
common law, to nullify or limit the application of specific rules is a poten-
tially devastating critique of the determinacy of legal doctrine. No matter
how specific and easy to apply a set of rules is, its application is rendered
less determinate if it coexists with legally enforceable standards that po-
tentially could be used to eviscerate it. For example, no matter how rigid
and easy to apply we make rules against trespass, they are rendered un-
certain if we allow a vague defense that the trespass was justified on the
ulability of social utility or general welfare arguments would allow the exception to swallow the rule;
at least it makes the line between the rule and the exception uncertain.
47. Rule one says that someone may do some act (a 19-year-old may vote), but rule two says that
the same person may not do the same act (a 19-year-old may not vote).
48. A logical contradiction exists when two rules that draw the line at different places exist in the
same jurisdiction.
49. The argument is that 17-year-olds are as mature as 18-year-olds and that to deny 17-year-
olds the right to vote deprives them of equal protection of the laws.
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grounds of public policy. A corsensus may exist that the defense should
apply only in cases of victims fleeing criminal assault or firefighters cross-
ing land to save a house. Nonetheless, a judge could always use the public
policy standard in any case to justify allowing the trespass. In every case,
a conscientious judge must determine whether to interpret the standard so
as to narrow existing rules. We know judges will not in fact do this, but it
is strong evidence of the indeterminacy of legal rules that they can do this.
3. Directive. Principles or theories are non-directive if they do not
help us choose among alternative possible rules; rules or standards are
non-directive if they do not help us determine the outcome of a particular
legal dispute. Principles and rules may be non-directive for several
reasons.
First, legal doctrines are non-directive if they are ambiguous. Ambigu-
ity may result from rules such as "be fair" or "liability is based on fault,"
that are too general to generate specific outcomes. Ambiguity may also
result from highly abstract concepts within rules, such as the concept of
"duress" in the rule that contracts made under duress will not be en-
forced. In a wide variety of cases, people will disagree about whether a
contractual party was subject to "duress."50 The outcome will depend on
judgments about whether the situation presented illegitimate pressures
such that the contract should not be enforced. To make this sort of rule
determine outcomes, it would have to be far more specific in detailing
when it applies.
Second, principles are indeterminate if they are circular. Tautological
statements do not guide us in deciding what to do. For example, the prin-
ciple that like cases should be treated alike does not help us decide what to
do, since no two cases are alike or unalike in every respect. The question
becomes whether to treat the cases alike for the purpose of a given rule.
Therefore, "like cases" are simply "cases that should be treated alike."5'
50. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MicH. L. REV. 253 (1947);
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 PoL. ScU. Q. 470, 476-78
(1923); Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Ref-
erence to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 576-83 (1982).
51. Even the most sophisticated traditional thinkers consider the principle of treating like cases
alike to be meaningful. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 113 ("The gravitational force of a
precedent may be explained by appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments, but to the fairness
of treating like cases alike."); J. RAwLs, supra note 14, at 237 ("The rule of law also implies the
precept that similar cases be treated similarly."). The only way to escape the principle's circularity is
to assume that we can identify what cases are like each other without knowing the purposes for which
we are comparing them. This assumption would be true if fact situations could be said to exhibit or
contain some intelligible essence which is simply there, and makes the cases, of necessity, fall into the
same category for any and all purposes. See R. UNGEsR, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrTIcs, 31-32 (1975).
Another example of a circular principle is the doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: Use
your rights so as not to injure the rights of others. This principle cannot help us decide whether a
property owner's actions on her property have exceeded the bounds of her property rights and en-
croached on those of her neighbor. The principle merely states that, to the extent one's neighbors have
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Third, rules are indeterminate because they generally do not determine
the scope of their own application. We can treat any rule as sui generis; at
the same time, we can apply any rule broadly to a wide range of situa-
tions. Moreover, seemingly broad rules may be narrowed through later
construction of exceptions or defenses.5"
Fourth, legal theories or rules may narrow choice within specified
boundaries but not tell us what to do within those boundaries.53 To the
extent they leave the lawmaker free to choose what to do, they are non-
directive.
4. Self-revising. Even if a legal theory or set of rules appears com-
pletely determinate-even if it appears comprehensive, consistent, and di-
rective-it may still allow choice if it does not specify under what circum-
stances existing rules should be followed and when and how they should
be changed. One of the fundamental principles of both common law and
public law adjudication is that the legal rules may be changed in appro-
priate circumstances." A fully determinate legal theory must provide for
the possibility of its own revision; it must tell us when to follow precedent
and when to reverse or overrule the precedent in the interest of fairness or
policy or social welfare. If it does not do this, we are free to choose
whether or not to follow the precedent; it therefore cannot determine the
outcome.
C. Why Legal Doctrine Is Predictable
The main problem with the claim that law is indeterminate is its fail-
ure to explain how we can predict, sometimes with surprising accuracy,
how the rules are going to be applied in specific cases. If we can predict
the outcome of a case, then it appears that the legal system or rights or
legal theory or something has determined the result in a way that is co-
herent and understandable. This problem can be resolved by distinguish-
ing between indeterminacy and arbitrariness. This distinction will clarify
why the claim that legal reasoning is indeterminate does not conflict with
the insight that legal results may be predictable.
Existing legal doctrines do not require judges or scholars to reach the
legal rights, one is not free to harm their interests. The principle does nothing to establish what
substantive rights are to be enforced by the law and does not tell us where to draw the line between a
property owner's liberty to act on her property and her neighbor's legal right to security from harm. I
have developed this point elsewhere at greater length. See Singer, supra note 42, at 1011-12.
52. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 126-27; Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41
YALE L.J. 201, 217 (1931) (differences in fact situations can always be used to distinguish cases).
53. H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 132.
54. See Singer, Catcher in the Rye Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 278 n.9 ; cf J. BENTHAM, OF
LAws IN GENERAL 191 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND *69-70.
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results they reach because the doctrines are sufficiently ambiguous or in-
ternally contradictory to justify any result we can imagine. Indeterminacy
does not mean that the choices that are made by those individuals are
arbitrary or capricious. It also does not mean that all outcomes are
equally likely to be considered or chosen by the decisionmaker. The inde-
terminacy of arguments is logically distinct from the arbitrariness of
choices."' It is perfectly possible for there to be predictable patterns of
behavior and decisionmaking even though the arguments advanced to jus-
tify the choices do not determine the outcomes. Saying that decision-
making is both indeterminate and nonarbitrary simply means that we can
explain judicial decisions only by reference to criteria outside the scope of
the judge's formal justifications.
56
Decisions can be arbitrary in two ways. First, they can be made in an
unconsidered manner. For example, one can decide to vote for someone by
flipping a coin or simply by choosing the name at the top of the ballot.
Decisions are also unconsidered if they are the result of whim or caprice
("If the Dodgers don't win tonight, I'll vote for Reagan!"). In each of
these cases, the decision is made in a manner that demonstrates that the
decisionmaker does not care about the result.17 By their very nature, these
decisions are unpredictable.
Second, decisions can be "arbitrary" because they are based on rela-
tively controversial values about which we do not expect unanimity. Those
decisions are "arbitrary" not because they are unconsidered, but because
they vary depending on the decisionmaker's beliefs.
Judges and scholars do consider their decisions or policy recommenda-
tions, and considered choices are "arbitrary" only in the second sense.
55. As Gordon argues:
The other argument rests, I think, on a misunderstanding of what the Critics mean by
indeterminacy. They don't mean-although some times they sound as if they do-that there
are never any predictable causal relations between legal forms and anything else. As argued
earlier in this essay, there are plenty of short- and medium-run stable regularities in social life,
including regularities in the interpretation and application, in given contexts, of legal rules.
Lawyers, in fact, are constantly making predictions for their clients on the basis of these regu-
larities. The Critical claim of indeterminacy is simply that none of these regularities are neces-
sary consequences of the adoption of a given regime of rules. The rule-system could also have
generated a different set of stabilizing conventions leading to exactly the opposite results and
may, upon a shift in the direction of political winds, switch to those opposing conventions at
any time.
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 125 (1984).
56. Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 22-26 (1924).
57. Some decisions of this sort may actually be considered. For example, one might argue that the
fairest way to implement a military draft is to use a lottery. In cases like this, however, a considered
decision is made to adopt an arbitrary procedure. The results are arbitrary as they affect specific
individuals, but the original decision to adopt the procedure is reached after reflection and conscious
choice. Moreover, the decision is justified by reasons that can be articulated (such as: "This is the
fairest way to distribute the calamity of military service"; "This method generates the least
controversy").
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This kind of arbitrariness does not, by itself, make prediction impossible.
Decisions that are not determined by a coherent theory, but which are
considered, may be predictable if we know enough about the context in
which the decision is made. This context includes the institutional setting
(for example, court or legislature), the customs of the community (such as
standard business practices), the role of the decisionmaker (judge, legisla-
tor, bureaucrat, professor), and the ideology of the decisionmaker. Legal
doctrine is a part of this context, and both influences and is influenced by
it. There are several reasons why an understanding of the legal context
may enable us to predict legal results.
First, an existing structure of legal argumentation orients thought ac-
cording to a predictable scheme."8 As long as we think of corporations as
private entities and municipalities as public entities, we are likely to apply
very different sets of rules and principles in judging their conduct.59 As
long as we think of the separation of powers as governing solely the rela-
tions among the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive, we are un-
likely to view corporations as repositories of sovereign power and include
them in considerations of how to balance power among governmental
institutions.60
Second, that orientation of thought limits the number and variety of
perceived ways to resolve conflicts. 1 As long as we think of labor law as a
set of rules and institutions to govern collective bargaining between unions
and employers, we are unlikely to consider the remedy of employee own-
ership of large enterprises.6 2 As long as we think of torts as involving a
choice between strict liability and negligence, we are unlikely to consider
adopting universal health and accident insurance coupled with regulatory
control of harmful behavior.
Third, the choices made by judges or legal theorists are often predict-
able because these decisionmakers share a legal culture. Although legal
doctrine may be sufficiently indeterminate that it could be used to justify
any outcome of a legal dispute, some rules and outcomes are more likely
to be considered attractive than others. For example, principles and
counterprinciples are often formulated as rules and exceptions; judges are
58. As Vandevelde points out:
Legal thought is, in essence, the process of categorization. The lawyer is taught to place phe-
nomena into categories such as fact or law, substance or process, public or private, contract or
tort, and foreseeable or unforeseeable, to name but a few. Categorizing phenomena determines
how they will be treated by the legal system.
Vandevelde, supra note 9, at 327.
59. See Frug, supra note 9, at 1128-54 (1980).
60. See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
61. See Gabel, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 302, 313 n.18 (1977) (reviewing R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)).
62. See Klare, supra note 9.
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more likely to fit cases within the rule than the exception. Over time the
identification of which principle is the rule and which is the exception
may change."3 Nonetheless, it is often possible to predict that the rule
rather than the exception will be used by the judge to decide the case.
Moreover, legal doctrines determine outcomes when those doctrines are
specific.64 If the rule is that only eighteen-year-olds are allowed to vote,
then seventeen-year-olds will not be allowed to vote. Viewed at this level
of specificity, the rule is sufficiently determinate to generate the outcome.
The rule becomes indeterminate only when viewed in conjunction with
more general principles that potentially could be used to nullify the rule,
such as the right to equal protection of the laws.
Legal doctrines are always potentially indeterminate. Judges can move
the line between rules and exceptions, or create new exceptions. They can
nullify the application of a rule to a particular case by widening a legally
enforceable standard so far that it eclipses the apparently applicable rule.
Ultimately, judges always have the power to revise the rules. That judges
may do these things, however, does not mean they will do them. Because
judges participate in a legal culture that suggests how they are to act as
judges, we can often predict how they will act.
The legal culture shared by judges and theorists encompasses shared
understandings of proper institutional roles and the extent to which the
status quo should be maintained or altered. This culture includes "com-
mon sense" understandings of what rules mean as well as conventions (the
identification of rules and exceptions) and politics (the differentiation be-
tween liberal and conservative judges).6 5
Convention, rather than logic, tells us that judges will not interpret the
Constitution to require socialism.' Nothing in the logic of constitutional
argumentation requires us to interpret it as supporting capitalism. A
plausible argument can easily be constructed to show that the Constitution
prohibits capitalism as it is currently practiced in the United States. For
63. See Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REv. 678 (1984) (ar-
guing that although consideration used to be the rule and promissory estoppel the excep-
tion-promissory estoppel is now the rule while consideration is the exception).
64. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, supra note 10, at 1687-89
(rules are formally realizable if they are capable of being applied in a determinate way).
65. Mark Tushnet has written:
[A]lthough we can ... use standard techniques of legal argument to draw from the decided
cases the conclusion that the Constitution requires socialism, we know that no judge will in the
near future draw that conclusion. But the failure to reach that result is not ensured because the
practice of "following rules" or neutral application of the principles inherent in the decided
cases precludes a judge from doing so. Rather, it is ensured because judges in contemporary
America are selected in a way that keeps them from thinking that such arguments make sense.
Tushnet, supra note 10, at 823 (citations omitted).
66. By logic, I mean necessary implications of constitutional principles (such as "the President
must be at least 35 years old"). Convention refers to commonly accepted interpretation of general
constitutional principles. See id.
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example, in order to pay dividends to stockholders, corporations must pay
employees a sum that is less than the full market value of what they pro-
duce. This is true if we accept John Locke's argument that the value of a
good is completely due to the labor that was expended to create it."7 If we
also accept Locke's argument that individuals have a natural right to the
full product of their labor, then to take some of the value of this product
to give to stockholders is to take a part of the employees' property. If we
accept Morris Cohen's argument that property rights are delegations of
sovereign power,"' the corporation's act can be attributed to the state, and
is therefore subject to regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
employees' property is taken without just compensation. The entire struc-
ture of wage labor on which capitalism is based therefore violates the
Constitution unless the government compensates workers for corporate
profits paid to shareholders.6 9
It is unlikely that a court in the United States would accept this argu-
ment. Yet there is nothing illogical about it. It is an elaboration of rights
arguments current in legal discourse. It simply uses those principles in an
unconventional fashion.70
Politics, as well as custom, tells us that the Constitution is not going to
be interpreted to prohibit wage labor. Politics, rather than legal reasoning,
tells us that Justices Brennan and Marshall are far more likely than Jus-
tices Burger or Rehnquist to nullify a state statute on the basis of race or
sex discrimination. There is nothing mysterious about this. We know who
the liberals are on the Court and who the conservatives are by the posi-
tions those individuals generally take on key political issues. This is not to
say, however, that Justice Marshall's theory of equal protection deter-
mines his decisions any more than Justice Rehnquist's theory does his.
These two Justices are able to rule in opposite directions precisely because
equal protection law plausibly can be used to justify both liberal and con-
servative outcomes.
This does not mean that judges enforce only rules they think are good
or that comport with their political views. Judges enforce rules with
67. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (1952) (1st ed. London 1690)
("Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed
his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.") But see
id. at 18 (arguing that I have a right to "the turfs my servant has cut").
68. See Cohen, supra note 60.
69. For a different argument that the Constitution requires socialism, see Tushnet, Dia-Tribe
(Book Review), 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 696-705 (1980).
70. See R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 321 ("[W]hen a practice has continued long enough the
conventions which make it possible-and which permit a consensus on how to divide it into
parts-are relatively easy to isolate."); Tushnet, supra note 10, at 823-25 (arguing that predictable
patterns of judicial behavior can be described on the basis of conventional images of institutional
behavior).
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which they strongly disagree. Every judge does this sometimes; most do it
often. At times, judges enforce such rules because they mistakenly believe
that legal reasoning requires them to do so. At other times, they are influ-
enced by their perceptions of how their actions will be greeted by their
relevant constituencies-other judges, lawyers, politicians, law journals,
professors, and the public. Or they may value predictability in that area of
law. Sometimes they act out of the belief that they are deferring to the
will of another branch of government, and that the political process
worked well enough and the rule is not oppressive enough to overturn the
apparent intent of that other governmental entity. To the extent we can
predict when judges will act contrary to their political views, we rely on
our knowledge of their past behavior and of their understanding of proper
institutional roles and of legal reasoning.
To the extent legal decisions are predictable, they can be explained by
legal culture. This does not mean that legal decisions are completely pre-
dictable. On many issues, no conventions are available. Many other issues
are outside mainstream political controversy and therefore we cannot pre-
dict what individual judges will think about them. It is precisely because
of these uncertainties as well as gaps in the legal rules, and because legal
reasoning is indeterminate and manipulable, that judges often surprise us
by using existing arguments to justify results that we did not expect.
For a legal theory to appear to determine results, one of two tricks must
be used. First, the theorist can define criteria for rule choice or can define
a rule that is sufficiently specific that there will be little or no disagree-
ment about the result it suggests. The theorist can then "apply" the rule
to get that result. But in doing so, the theorist must ignore counterargu-
ments or potentially contradictory principles that could plausibly be used
to justify a different result, even though the same theorist might whole-
heartedly accept those positions in other situations.
Second, the theorist can make a series of limiting assumptions that so
narrow the field of choice as to make a principle appear to determine
outcomes. This method masks the underlying politically controversial
choices that have to be made before applying the theory.
7 1
In summary, the legal theories advanced to justify our rules and institu-
tions are indeterminate. The same theories could be used to justify very
different sorts of institutions and very different rules. This does not mean,
however, that outcomes in our legal system are completely unpredictable
or that the choices made by judges are arbitrary in the sense that they are
unconsidered. Considered choices can be described and even predicted to
71. This is the typical procedure of the law and economics literature. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Entitlement Problems, supra note 10.
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some extent because they are conditioned by legal culture, conventions,
"common sense," and politics. Custom, rather than reason, narrows the





Man is the measure of all things.
-Protagoras 7
A. The Search for Certain First Principles
Might does not make right. But what does? The project of objectivity is
creating standards by which we can judge the legitimacy of our political
institutions and our legal rules."' Not just any standards will do; they
must be correct and founded on reason." This is the quest started by
Plato: The search for rational criteria that will tell us that a moral view is
not just someone's considered opinion or even the opinion of everyone, but
that it is right and true, an accurate representation of the good.
The view that morality, legal rules and political institutions can be
judged and legitimated by objective standards is the view that morality is a
matter of knowledge rather than conviction. 6 Virtue, according to Plato,
is knowledge. Moral positions are not merely acceptable or unacceptable;
they are true or false, and one can demonstrate their truth or falsity by
rational argument.
I reject this view. The attempts to provide a rational foundation for
72. See PLATO, PROTAGORAS 99 (W. Guthrie trans. 1956). See E. BARKER, THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 47 (1959) (calling this principle "Socrates' great maxim").
73. E. BARKER, supra note 72, at 32.
74. As Rawls states:
[T]hese principles are objective. They are the principles that we would want everyone (includ-
ing ourselves) to follow were we to take up together the appropriate general point of view. The
original position defines this perspective, and its conditions also embody those of objectivity: its
stipulations express the restrictions on arguments that force us to consider the choice of princi-
ples unencumbered by the singularities of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. The
veil of ignorance prevents us from shaping our moral view to accord with our own particular
attachments and interests. We do not look at the social order from our situation but take up a
point of view that everyone can adopt on equal footing. In this sense we look at our society and
our place in it objectively: we share a common standpoint along with others and do not make
our judgments from a personal slant.
J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 516-17.
75. See id. at 517-18 ("But unless there existed a common perspective, the assumption of which
narrowed differences of opinion, reasoning and argument would be pointless and we would have no
rational grounds for believing in the soundness of our convictions.").
76. I assume here that morality is intersubjectively valid, that it is true for all persons (at least
within the same culture).
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legal theory have been incoherent. Theories are "incoherent" when they
set impossible tasks for themselves: They purport to give us guidance in
deciding what to believe and what to do, yet they are either so vague or
ambiguous as to give us no real help, or they are internally contradictory,
telling us to do opposite things." In my view, the question of what we
should do, or of which rules and institutions we should create, is not a
matter of truth or falsity. It is not a question of accurate representation of
the "good," and it is not a question that can be resolved once and for all
by a rational decision procedure. Rather, our views of what we should do
are the result of experience, emotion, and conversation. This conversation
occurs in a social and historical context. The conversation will continue as
long as human beings live in a society that permits them to talk freely
with each other. And as long as the conversation continues, we will recon-
sider and sometimes revise our beliefs.
The issue of objectivity is related to, but different from, the issue of
determinacy. The question of determinacy asks: Do our theories deter-
mine our rules and institutions and do those rules determine outcomes?
The question of objectivity asks: Even if those theories determine results,
what makes those institutions and doctrines legitimate?78 The issues are
related because indeterminate theories leave us free to choose, and if we
are free to choose, we have no assurance that our choices accord with the
good. The issues are separate because determinate theories may or may
not be legitimate, and legitimate rules and institutions may or may not be
supported by determinate theories.
Unlike the critique of claims of determinacy, the critique of objectivity
is for the most part an external critique. Rather than a demonstration that
traditional theory does not live up to its own promises, it is a dispute
about what the fundamental premises of law and legal reasoning should
be.
The project of creating criteria for legal theory assumes that it is possi-
ble to ground the legal system on a rational foundation. This assumption
means that the first principles from which we derive the legal rules should
have some kind of inherent validity independent of our individual beliefs.
A rational foundation for legal doctrine may be based on either a substan-
tive or a procedural theory. Legal doctrine has a substantive foundation if
it accurately reflects some external source that is asserted to be founda-
tional.79 Legal doctrine has a procedural foundation if, regardless of its
77. I will not prove that it is impossible to provide a rational foundation for moral or legal theory;
I will merely explain why the prevalent attempts to do so either founder on their internal contradic-
tions or are circular.
78. Institutions and doctrines are legitimate if they accurately embody or express the good.
79. If this seems to be circular, it is. But all theorists recognize that, at some point, the search for
first principles has to stop, and we simply have to assert that something is the basis for everything
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specific content, it is reached through a decision procedure that is theoreti-
cally capable of producing agreement."0
The traditional nineteenth-century substantive foundations of the legal
system were positivism and natural law. These two philosophies each de-
fine the source of law. Positivism is the belief that commands of the sover-
eign are the source of law.81 These commands are legitimate because the
sovereign is legitimate.8 2 Natural law is the belief that a structure of indi-
vidual rights founded in nature is the source of law.8" The structure of
these rights may be found either outside human beings, in nature or God,
or inside human beings, in their thinking patterns.8 4
Both substantive theories assume that a method exists to determine,
more or less accurately, what rights are and how they can be applied.
Traditional theorists have offered two methods: rights analysis and
utilitarianism.85 Each assumes that one can identify (or invent) a process
of reasoning prior to reaching specific conclusions that will both help de-
termine outcomes in many specific cases and accord with some criteria all
rational individuals must accept.88 Because both rights and utility theories
else. See Moore, supra note 6, at 1072-75, 1106-16.
My distinction between procedural and substantive foundations is not intended to describe separate
classes of theorists. Many, if not most, theorists combine both sorts of arguments. The distinction is
derived from Duncan Kennedy. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 259 ("The basic alternatives here are
(a) that rational reflection on human nature and the structure of social life will tell us what rights we
have, or (b) that we can arrive at legitimate decision rules about how to specify rights even if we can't
guarantee that all rational people will agree on the substantive outcomes of this process.").
80. The qualification "theoretically" is important. All theorists recognize that people do not agree,
even when they are trying to apply the same decision procedure-for example, Rawls' theory of
justice. This failure to agree does not by itself destroy the validity of the decisionmaking procedure or
its claim to objectivity. The claim of unanimity is more limited. Rawls and others contend only that
everyone would agree if everyone applied the method correctly. See J. RAwLs, supra note 14, at 21
("[T]he conditions embodied in the description of the original position are ones that we do in fact
accept. Or if we do not, then perhaps we can be persuaded to do so by philosophical reflection.").
81. 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 550-51 (3d. ed. 1869); J. BENTHAM, supra note
54, at 1, 18-30.
82. The source of nineteenth century legal positivism was Hobbes. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
264-65 (1968) (1st ed. London 1651) ("For it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign
Representative can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or
Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth
Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe
the laws of Nature.").
83. The source of nineteenth century natural law theory was Locke. See J. LOCKE, supra note 67,
at 48-50, 70-73 (asserting that people institute governments to preserve their natural rights).
84. See R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 177-78, 316.
85. While most positivists are utilitarians and most natural law theorists are rights analysts, there
is no logical reason why this must be so. A positivist could believe that rights analysis is the proper
method to determine what the commands of the sovereign are. In other words, a positivist could
believe that the sovereign has adopted utilitarianism as a method of deciding which commands to
issue, or the positivist could assume that the sovereign has adopted rights theory as its ruling princi-
ple. The natural law thinker can believe that the content of natural law is defined by the method of
utilitarianism or by rights analysis.
86. See J. RAwgs, supra note 14, at 517-18.
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share this assumption, I see them as having far more in common than
their champions will allow."'
Underlying the traditional sources and methods of legal reasoning is
one fundamental premise: The assumption that it is at least theoretically
possible to achieve a rational consensus among interlocutors that will tell
us, once and for all, how we should go about deciding moral and legal
questions.8" This premise must be taken apart because it is at once the
heart of traditional legal theory and its Achilles heel.
B. Substantive Foundations
1. Are moral values true? As in the nineteenth century, contempo-
rary legal theorists who seek to provide a substantive foundation for legal
rights generally divide into two camps: positivists and rights thinkers.
H.L.A. Hart has modernized John Austin's view of legal rights as com-
mands of the sovereign.89 The modern positivists tend to equate law with
canonical texts-constitutions, statutes, regulations, judicial opinions,
court rules, legislative reports, executive orders-that have been promul-
gated by some authoritative governmental source, and with unwritten
rules that are accepted by the sovereign as having coercive power. Ronald
Dworkin is the most famous of the rights thinkers.90 The modern rights
thinkers tend to equate law with rights that individuals simply have, re-
gardless of whether the state has promulgated any authoritative expres-
sion of those rights.
The concept of accurate representation assumes that law is a matter of
knowledge rather than judgment. Law is something that can be perceived;
it does not have to be created. The weakness of the theory that law is
found and not made91 is apparent when we notice that this theory is both
87. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the rights thinkers were generally the conservatives
and the utilitarians were the progressives. Today, the rights thinkers are the progressives and the
utilitarians (law and economics thinkers) are the conservatives. This alignment is not logically neces-
sary: Progressives used economic theory in the 1960's to justify regulation of pollution, see Kennedy,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems, supra note 10, at 393-95, and conservatives have used
rights theory to further libertarian programs.
88. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 11, 17; cf. R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 316-18
(discussion of commensurability); M. SANDEL, supra note 4, at 104-05 (describing the basis of social
contract theory). When I say "once and for all" I do not mean to suggest that whatever answer is
reached could never be changed (although that is certainly what the rhetoric of these theorists sug-
gests) but that the procedure for determining that answer must be irrevocably set. Such a procedure
might include criteria for determining when to revise substantive results, as well as criteria for deter-
mining when and how to revise procedures for determining results.
89. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 14.
90. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 14.
91. Id. at 81 ("It remains the judge's duty, even in hard cases, to discover what the rights of the
parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively."); H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 92-93 (dis-
cussing rules of recognition which purport to identify which rules are to be legally enforced). Both
Hart and Dworkin recognize that while judicial decisions simply represent the external source, other
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descriptive and normative. It uses the metaphor of discovery and accurate
representation to describe both the legal rules that are in force and the
legal rules that should be enforced. We can know what the rules should
be-as well as what they are-if we examine the Constitution or the con-
cept of rights. Thus, these theories turn normative statements into descrip-
tive statements. To know what we should do, we simply have to develop a
true picture of something out there. If the rules correspond to what is out
there, then they are right and good.
The motive that underlies the metaphors of discovery and accurate rep-
resentation is the search for certainty. We can know what is right and
wrong, or what the law should be, if we can perceive it. If making legal
decisions is a matter of accurate representation, rather than choice, it is
possible to argue that rights are matters that can be proven to be right or
wrong. If a viewpoint is a matter of perception rather than judgment, it
can be thought to be true or false rather than merely preferable or
inferior.
I reject the view that legal rules are legitimate if they accurately re-
present some external source. This position converts questions that re-
quire active judgment and choice-normative questions-into questions
that seem to require only passive mimicry.92 It is wrong to turn discre-
tionary normative decisions into non-discretionary descriptions. Such theo-
ries mystify us by obscuring important facts: To figure out how we should
act and live together, we must make moral choices. The answers are not
sitting out there ready for us to pick up, like manna from heaven.
2. Accurate representation and the problem of method. Legal theo-
ries that purport to provide a substantive foundation for legal rules as-
sume that we can know what the legal rules should be by describing such
things as the Constitution or rights. Positivists point to the Constitution,
meaning both the text of the authoritative document and the unwritten
rules that judges recognize as having coercive power.9" Rights theorists
point to nature or reality or consensus or reason or some combination of
those. 94 In either case, the thing to be described must be described accu-
decisions involve creativity. Nonetheless, both assert that the basic structure of the legal system can
and should be set by describing an external source.
92. The dispute between these two methods of justification of social institutions is an old one.
The philosophical differences between Socrates and Protagoras fall along these lines. Socrates' maxim
was "virtue is knowledge"; this maxim meant that morality is a matter of truth and of accurate
representation of the good rather than mere opinion. E. BARKER, supra note 72, at 47. See also
PLATO, supra note 72, at 99. Protagoras denied that morality is a matter of truth; he believed that
morality is a matter of individual conviction: "[M]an is the measure of all things." E. BARKER, supra
note 72, at 32.
93. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 14, at 92-93.
94. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 129 ("Hercules must defer, not to his own judgment
of the institutional morality of his community, but to the judgment of most members of that commu-
nity about what that is."); Moore, supra note 6, at 1144 ("[Ilt is the nature of things, and not social
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rately for the foundation to be genuine. The problem is that both the
Constitution and rights are too general to describe accurately without say-
ing much more about them. Legal theorists who rely on the metaphor of
accurate representation therefore become obsessed with the problem of
method. If the mind is a mirror of external reality, then the goal of legal
theory must be to polish the mirror so that the representations of the
world outside are accurate and detailed. 5 This preoccupation with polish-
ing makes substantive theories resemble theories that are based solely on
method.
Rhetorically, however, substantive theories of law are quite different
from purely procedural theories. The goal of substantive theories is to
represent accurately substantive rules that exist somewhere. Theories that
are based solely on identifying an objective decision procedure do not as-
sume that any particular right answer exists. On the contrary, they as-
sume that objectivity is reached by using a proper decision procedure, and
that the rule, whatever it turns out to be, is the right one. The substantive
theory assumes that right rules exist and that we can find them. A proce-
dural theory assumes that no rule is right apart from a method; the right
method yields the right rule. The sense in which such a method is "objec-
tive" is the subject of the next section.
C. Decision Procedures
1. Legal reasoning. Procedural theories assume that law is justified
only if it is reached through a decision procedure that properly assesses all
the relevant factors and generates outcomes. This decision procedure is
what most law professors mean when they talk about "legal reasoning."
When legal scholars claim that legal reasoning is justified only if it is
objective, they have at least two points in mind. First, they distinguish
between subjective, personal preference, and objective, interpersonal valid-
ity. The subjective/objective dichotomy assumes that a basic distinction
exists between opinions that are merely a matter of personal preference
about which we do not expect agreement, and opinions that are intersub-
jectively valid and about which, as a result, we do expect intelligent per-
sons of good will to be able to agree. Moral views are intersubjectively
valid if they are views that everyone who thought about moral issues from
a legitimate common perspective such as Rawls' veil of ignorance would
conventions, that determines the extension of a moral word."); Radin, supra note 26, at 969 n.44
("[O]ur present state of philosophical enlightenment on the subject of moral objectivity seems to be
consonant with the argument that 'deep' moral consensus-not mere social consensus, or subjective
preference counting-should be treated as objective for political purposes.") (citation omitted).
95. See R. RoRTY, supra note 13, at 131-64.
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accept." Proponents of procedural objectivity expect agreement not about
the particular substantive outcomes (the legal rules and standards) but
about the method of reaching outcomes (legdl reasoning).
Second, theories of procedural objectivity seek to separate individual in-
tuition from rational technique. The underlying assumption is that we
should not trust our intuitions about how the rules should be set. Because
they are unprincipled, those intuitions are unjustified and may reflect
merely personal preference. They can be justified only by showing how
they relate to some process of legal reasoning that generates them. Legal
reasoning therefore appears as a decision procedure that is removed from
those intuitions.
The appearance of objectivity is generated by combining two assump-
tions: intersubjectivity and logical technique. To appear intersubjectively
valid, the first principles of legal reasoning are made sufficiently vague so
that it will appear that there is, or should be, general agreement about
their validity. No one is against liberty, fairness, efficiency, or equality.
The generality, ambiguity, and impersonality of these concepts allow ene-
mies to appear to agree. These concepts are further removed from specific
outcomes by a process of legal reasoning that itself appears impersonal
and logical rather than controversial and ideological. This process may
take the form of balancing tests, social contract theories, or economic anal-
ysis. Both the first principles and the decision procedure appear to be
removed from the specific outcomes and unrelated to them in any obvious,
direct way. To assume that this method justifies legal rules is therefore to
assume that our intuitions have no independent validity.
Roe v. Wade97 typifies this method. Justice Blackmun acknowledged at
the very start that the abortion issue was highly controversial:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and
emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous oppos-
ing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly
absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's
experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence,
one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family and
their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to
observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and
conclusions about abortion.
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial
overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem."8
96. See J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 516-18.
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. Id. at 116.
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Nonetheless, legal reasoning would answer the constitutional question
perfectly free from such controversial considerations: "Our task, of course,
is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and
of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this . . . ." This sort of argu-
ment illegitimately turns controversial judgments into matters of logical
technique, to matters, as Justice Blackmun says, of "measurement." This
rhetoric obscures what is really going on and is wrong.
I find this example typical because it demonstrates that even when ev-
eryone agrees that a legal issue is politically controversial and that its
resolution depends on choosing between irreconcilable religious views and
visions of social life, jurists persist in asserting that the issue must be de-
cided in a manner that thrusts such considerations aside. It is obvious that
a decision on the constitutional legitimacy of laws limiting access to abor-
tions must reflect controversial judgments. Thus any intimation that the
decision could be made in a logical manner is ridiculous. Nonetheless,
Justice Blackmun made the traditional claim that he possessed a method
of constitutional analysis-of legal reasoning-that avoided the necessity
of moral choice. According to Justice Blackmun, the Constitution had al-
ready made the requisite moral choice; the only task for the Court was to
determine what that choice was. Legal reasoning, Justice Blackmun sug-
gested, involved the application of universal principles about which we
should all agree (constitutional analysis) rather than of particular princi-
ples about which we do not expect agreement (religion, politics, morality).
It is understandable that the more controversial and politicized the deci-
sion, the more a court will want to appear above controversy. Such false
appeals to neutrality are, nonetheless, illegitimate. When judges write
opinions justifying their disposition of cases and their choices of rule, they
should feel free honestly to express what they really were thinking about
when they decided the case. These revelations will clarify the moral and
political views at stake in legal controversies. Judges should also explicitly
discuss the social context surrounding the legal dispute. There is prece-
dent for the form of expression I am advocating: Many judges have pro-
vided legitimate arguments to justify what they have done without pre-
tending that their decisions were derived in some logical (uncontroversial)
fashion from precedent. For example, in State v. Shack,100 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that a property owner could not exclude legal
services and health workers from visiting migrant farmworkers on his
property. In a short, beautifully written opinion, Chief Justice Weintraub
described the values at stake in the controversy and the social context sur-
99. Id.
100. 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
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rounding .the legal relationships.0 1 He argued rightly that migrant
farmworkers were powerless in relation to many others in society, that
they provided needed services to the economy, and that they themselves
were in great need of communal assistance. He discussed the interests at
stake on both sides, and, referring to other situations in which property
owners were under a legal duty to allow others access to their property,
stated that property owners' rights to exclude others were not unlimited.
Further, Justice Weintraub acknowledged that the law "is not static," 102
and that vast changes had occurred in the legal rules governing legal rela-
tions among persons with respect to the use of land. Finally, he asserted:
We see no profit in trying to decide upon a conventional category
and then forcing the present subject into it. That approach would be
artificial and distorting. The quest is for a fair adjustment of the
competing needs of the parties, in the light of the realities of the
relationship between the migrant worker and the operator of the
housing facility.10
This approach to legal argumentation differs markedly from Justice
Blackmun's false assertion that Roe v. Wade was decided on the basis of
"constitutional measurement."1104
2. Commensuration and normal discourse. Two concepts, commen-
suration and normal discourse, describe two different ways of viewing the
objectivity of legal reasoning. The first possible meaning of objectivity is
commensuration: Legal reasoning is objective if it accords with an innate,
antecedently existing thinking process common to all people or, at the very
least, to everyone in our culture.1 05 The commonality of this thinking pro-
cess is what makes it objective rather than subjective. Subjective views are
101. Justice Weintraub wrote:
Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.
Title to real property cannot include dominion over the destiny of persons the owner permits
to come upon the premises. Their well-being must remain the paramount concern of a system
of law. Indeed the needs of the occupants may be so imperative and their strength so weak,
that the law will deny the occupants the power to contract away what is deemed essential to
their health, welfare, or dignity.
Here we are concerned with a highly disadvantaged segment of our society. We are told that
every year farmworkers and their families numbering more than one million leave their home
areas to fill the seasonal demand for farm labor in the United States. . . . The migrant
farmworkers come to New Jersey in substantial numbers.
The migrant farmworkers are a community within but apart from the local scene. They are
rootless and isolated. Although the need for their labors is evident, they are unorganized and
without economic or political power. It is their plight alone that summoned government to
their aid.
Id. at 303, 277 A.2d at 372.
102. Id. at 305, 277 A.2d at 373.
103. Id. at 307, 277 A.2d at 374.
104. 410 U.S. at 116.
105. See R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 316.
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those reached by individual, personal considerations; objective views are
those reached by the framework for discussion that constitutes a common
ground for all people. Legal reasoning is rational if it is based on this
common ground. To assume that all discourse about law can and should
be commensurable is to assume that all human beings innately possess a
common thinking process.1 °0 This common ground constitutes a perma-
nent, neutral framework for inquiry.107 If all conversation about law is
capable of being conducted within a single framework through a decision
procedure, then all disagreements among lawyers, judges, and scholars do
not simply involve differences of opinion but must be explained as mis-
takes. If people do not agree, someone is thinking incorrectly.
I do not accept the proposition that all discourse about law can be ren-
dered commensurable-that theoretically we all should be performing the
same decision procedure (legal reasoning) that, if performed correctly, will
generate determinate and valid answers to all questions about what the
legal rules should be. Not all discourse about law can be crammed into a
single decision procedure, and human beings simply do not have an innate
thinking process that unites us all in a common framework of inquiry.
The second possible meaning of objectivity is normal discourse. "Nor-
mal discourse" is Richard Rorty's extension of Thomas Kuhn's concept of
normal science. l08
[N]ormal discourse is that which is conducted within an agreed-upon
set of conventions about what counts as a relevant contribution, what
counts as answering a question, what counts as having a good argu-
ment for that answer or a good criticism of it. Abnormal discourse is
what happens when someone joins in the discourse who is ignorant
of these conventions or who sets them aside.109
If normal discourse is what we mean by objectivity, then a view is ob-
jective if it has been discussed by a group of persons who agree on the
criteria for describing and judging it, and they do in fact agree about it. 10
106. Id. at 316-18.
107. By "neutral" I mean unrelated to considerations that vary from person to person. Also, a
"permanent" framework may provide for the possibility of evolution of legal rules.
108. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENIFIC REVOLmONS 23-51 (2d ed. 1970) (normal
science establishes a paradigm of rules governing questions that are interesting, evidence that would
answer those questions, and answers that are acceptable).
109. R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 320.
110. As Rorty says:
To sum up this "existentialist" view of objectivity, then: objectivity should be seen as con-
formity to the norms of justification (for assertions and for actions) we find about us. Such
conformity becomes dubious and self-deceptive only when seen as something more than
this-namely, as a way of obtaining access to something which "grounds" current practices of
justification in something else.
Id. at 361. See also L. WrrrGENSTEIN, ON CERTiTs'Y § 404, at 52e (D. Paul & G. Anscombe
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If people within a relevant community agree to a certain proposition, then
the proposition satisfies criteria or arguments that they accept. All objec-
tivity means is agreement among people. Under this view, the word "ob-
jective" is an empty compliment we confer on principles with which we
agree. The compliment is empty because it is circular: People accept a
legal rule if it is based on objective principles; objective principles are
principles those people accept; people therefore accept the legal rule be-
cause they agree with it.
To escape this circle, it is necessary to believe that human beings pos-
sess an overarching and antecedently existing rational method that tells us
how to decide legal or moral questions. This is the belief that reason can
adjudicate value conflicts. But we have no antecedently existing rational
method to determine whether people are justified in accepting the criteria
they accept. We can judge the criteria that others accept only by whatever
criteria we accept. If they do not accept our criteria, there is no way to
prove that they are wrong. As Richard Rorty has said, "We have not got
a language which will serve as a permanent neutral matrix for formulat-
ing all good explanatory hypotheses, and we have not the foggiest notion
of how to get one." '
3. Rational consensus. Rational consensus is the most common deci-
sion procedure that traditional legal theorists contend provides an objective
foundation for legal rules." 2 Rational consensus does not assume merely
that it is possible for intelligent people to agree on important moral and
political issues if people think carefully about them; it assumes that ra-
tional agreement is the ultimate source of those values or is the foundation
on which they rest. It assumes not only that if reasonable people talk long
enough they will agree on the criteria for determining the legal rules but
trans. 1969) ("I want to say: it's not that on some points men know the truth with perfect certainty.
No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude.").
111. R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 348-49. Rorty is undaunted by these limitations.
The question is not whether human knowledge in fact has "foundations," but whether it
makes sense to suggest that it does-whether the idea of epistemic or moral authority having a
"ground" in nature is a coherent one. For the pragmatist in morals, the claim that the customs
of a given society are "grounded in human nature" is not one which he knows how to argue
about. He is a pragmatist because he cannot see what it would be like for a custom to be so
grounded.
Id. at 178. When lawyers and judges talk about "sound arguments," they vacillate between meaning
that the arguments are conventional and that they are rational. A conventional argument accords with
traditional rhetoric; a rational argument is based on the common ground supposedly shared by every-
one engaged in legal reasoning.
112. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 125-30; J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 516-18;
Radin, supra note 26, at 969 & n.44. The metaphor of rational consensus underlies virtually every
major current legal theory, including social contract theories and theories of efficiency. For an exam-
ple of the latter, see R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 88-98 (outlining the
consensual basis of wealth maximization and efficiency as criteria for legal rules).
The Yale Law Journal
that reason will generate an accurate picture of our society's rational
consensus.
The possibility of accurately describing our society's rational consensus
provides a foundation for legal theory and allows us to believe in the ob-
jectivity of legal reasoning. If we go through the proper method of figur-
ing out what our society's rational consensus is, then we will know what
to do. This procedure combines the metaphor of accurate representation
and the metaphor of a decision procedure. We are trying to generate an
accurate picture of the considered judgment of the community; at the same
time, we are trying to figure out what the considered view of others would
be if everyone thought in a sufficiently rational way.
The idea of rational consensus is a mixed metaphor in a second way. It
repeats, rather than resolves, the subjective/objective dichotomy. Accurate
representation of community views appears objective because the view of a
substantial segment of the community-consensus-is distinct from the
particular views of any individual. At the same time, accurate representa-
tion of community views appears subjective because the answer is simply
whatever the considered majority opinion happens to be; there is no guar-
antee that that opinion is right by some other standard. Similarly, the
decision procedure of discerning what the consensus would be if the com-
munity thought properly about the issue appears objective because the de-
cision procedure constrains arbitrary choice. At the same time, the deci-
sion procedure of rational consensus appears subjective because the goal is
to discover what people want rather than what they should want.
Rational agreement appears both objective and subjective because it
combines two competing foundations for legal theory: consensus and rea-
son. These are the two-and the only two-foundations that have been
proposed by traditional legal theorists to provide the objective procedure
for legal reasoning.
Consensus is a necessary basis for the liberal society because govern-
ments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed.""1 3 One
strand of liberal thought stresses the fact that individuals have different
but equally legitimate values and goals.'114 According to another strand,
people have the same but competing goals: They all seek power, wealth,
and prestige," 5 and these individual goals are achieved at the expense of
113. The Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Political power is assumed here to
surge upward from the people to the government, and not, as the medieval thinkers assumed, from
God down to the sovereign. See W. ULLMANN, LAW AND POLTrCS IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1975).
114. See J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 254; M. SANDEL, supra note 4, at 9-10, 116-17; R.
UNGER, supra note 51, at 42-46, 76-81.
115. The foremost proponent of this view is Hobbes:
[T]he Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or
lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to
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other individuals. In either case, people must structure society in a way
that enables them to achieve those individual goals. They must form a
social contract. 6 under which they agree to a form of government that
will limit their freedom in some ways to ensure that they will be able to
obtain their individual goals to some extent. The laws governing us there-
fore cannot be legitimate unless we somehow agree to them, either
through custom or legislation.
Consensus theorists acknowledge, however, that consensus alone is an
insufficient basis for government and law. Everyone could agree to some-
thing horrible, like slavery. 117 We all have deeply felt moral beliefs that
would prompt each of us to believe that certain practices are evil, even if
everyone in the world believed otherwise. Thus theorists who claim that
consensus is a sufficient basis for objective legal decisions invariably intro-
duce competing criteria to take care of these situations.
The consensus theorist envisions a certain kind of social agreement. It
takes place under certain conditions and presupposes certain sorts of
mental gymnastics. In Rousseau's version, a participant in the social con-
tract seeks the good of everyone, not just herself. 18 This ensures the
proper limits to individual self-assertion. In Rawls' version, a participant
in the social contract seeks her individual goals under certain conditions
that will ensure an enlightened outcome. 1
Consensus theories incorporate the second foundation for legal the-
ory-reason. The social contract never took place; it is an intellectual con-
struct designed to help us determine, not what other people around us
the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of
Power.
T. HOBBES, supra note 82, at 139. See generally C. MACPHESON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF
POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALSm: HOBBES To LOCKE 29-46 (1962) (discussing Hobbes' analysis of indi-
vidual motivation).
116. Since the seventeenth century, the idea of a social contract has played a central role in the
thought of many prominent liberal thinkers. T. HOBBES, supra note 82, at 228 ("[Mien agree
amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be
protected by him against all others."); J. LOCKE, supra note 67, at 54 ("The only way whereby any
one divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with
other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security against any that are
not of it."); J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 11 (The principles of justice "are the principles that free and
rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality
as defining the fundamental terms of their association."); J. RoUssEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 15
(G. Cole trans. 1950) ("Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme
direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible
part of the whole.") (original italicized).
117. E.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (importation of slaves shall not be prohibited before
1808).
118. J. RoussEAu, supra note 116, at 26-28.
119. J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 11-22.
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think, but what reasonable people of adequate experience would think if
they followed a rational decision procedure.
We must be able accurately to describe rational consensus if it is to
provide an objective basis for our moral or political views, or for legal
rights. If we cannot accurately describe it, then rational consensus cannot
provide a determinate answer to our question of what the legal rules
should be.
Rational consensus cannot form an objective foundation to legal reason-
ing because it cannot, by itself, generate determinate answers; it cannot do
this because it founders on its internal contradictions. Because the idea of
rational consensus is internally contradictory, it cannot determine our con-
clusions, nor can it function as the source of those conclusions or as a
procedure for generating objective results. Michael Sandel has eloquently
described the internal contradictions in the theory of rational consensus.
If the parties to the original contract choose the principles of jus-
tice, what is to say that they have chosen rightly? And if they choose
in the light of principles antecedently given, in what sense can it be
said that they have chosen at all? The question of justification thus
becomes a question of priority; which comes first-really ultimately
first-the contract or the principle?
20
The idea of rational consensus conflates its two underlying assumptions; it
therefore hides the underlying contradiction. Because there is no answer to
the contradiction, we find ourselves going back and forth between the
principle that a certain social practice is justified because others agree
with it and the principle that the social practice is justified because reason
(our innate decision procedure) tells us that it is right, regardless of what
others currently say.
It is therefore impossible to describe rational consensus accurately. It is
never clear whether one is describing what people actually believe or what
they should believe if they thought about it rationally. We cannot have it
both ways. In the absence of a metatheory that can tell us how to limit
consensus through reason, we are left free to choose between them. Be-
cause legal reasoning does not describe an antecedently existing common
ground, it cannot tell us what to do.
D. A Parable
Let me conclude this section with an anecdote, an anecdote that I con-
sider a parable. When I was in college, I became dose friends with some-
120. M. SANDEL, supra note 4, at 119 (emphasis in original).
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one whose political beliefs were different from mine. We are still good
friends. We disagreed about certain matters that we considered important.
We talked about these issues a lot, partly because we found them interest-
ing and partly because we could not understand why we disagreed. Most
important, however, we were close friends, and we each cared a great deal
about what the other thought. After four years of these discussions, I be-
came frustrated because I could not convince my friend that he was wrong
about certain things. He believed things that I considered, and still con-
sider, morally wrong. I had assumed all along that if we talked long
enough, and that if we were both people of good faith trying to reach the
right answer, we would eventually agree. But we did not agree.
I found that I had to give up one of the underlying assumptions on
which I had based our long conversations. I could give up the idea that
my friend was intelligent. In that case our disagreement could be ex-
plained by his stupidity. Or I could give up the idea that I was intelligent
and explain our disagreement by my inadequate mental capacity. Alterna-
tively, I could give up the idea that we were both acting in good faith, that
we were both trying to reach the right answers and were not just playing
games with each other. But I believed that we were intelligent people of
good will. I could also conclude that one or both of us were mistaken
about what was right. But this did not make sense to me. We held our
different positions because of values that were important to us, and I did
not see how we could be mistaken about what was important to us. The
only alternative was to give up the final assumption: the belief that if we
talked long enough we would eventually agree. And that is what I did.
The point of this story is not that agreement is impossible, nor is it that
conversations must end-they can continue forever despite the absence of
agreement. The point is that morality is not a matter of truth or logical
demonstration. It is a matter of conviction based on experience, emotion
and conversation. When I say that legal reasoning is not objective, I am
merely emphasizing that I observe substantial political and moral contro-
versy about what we should allow people to do with themselves and each
other. Since legal reasoning includes and systematizes all of the conflicting
arguments that people find plausible, there is no reason to expect it to
provide a basis for decisionmaking that transcends these ordinary value
conflicts.
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III. NEUTRALITY
Liberty in adopting a conception of the good is limited only by prin-
ciples that are deduced from a doctrine which imposes no prior con-
straints on these conceptions.
-John Rawls2
1
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor




Traditional theorists claim that law is, or should be, neutral.123 Neu-
trality encompasses two quite different claims. The first claim is that indi-
viduals should be allowed the freedom to have different conceptions of the
good life and should be permitted to pursue their particular ideas of hap-
piness. 24 The second claim is that the limits to individual freedom of ac-
tion set by the legal system should be based on independent principles of
justice that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the
good.
125
These two claims together represent a political vision. This vision is
associated with a series of dichotomies that purport to divide the world
between non-controversial values and relatively controversial values: rea-
son and desire, control and freedom of action, law and politics, law and
morality, objective and subjective, the right and the good, state and indi-
vidual, public and private, principled and arbitrary, universal and partic-
ular.126 These dichotomies repeat over and over the basic message of neu-
121. J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 254.
122. A. FRANCE, LE Lys RoUGE (1894), quoted in J. BARTLEIT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 802
(14th ed. 1968).
123. See B. ACxERMAN, supra note 14, at 11 ("Neutrality. No reason [for political authority] is a
good reason if it requires the power holder to assert ... that his conception of the good is better than
that asserted by any of his fellow citizens.. . ."); J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 254 (arguing that legal
principles of justice are independent of individual conceptions of the good); J. RoussEu, supra note
116, at 13-14 ("'The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the
whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself
with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before."'); M. SANDEL, supra note 4, at
5 ("Persons. . . differ in their conceptions of what happiness consists in, and to install any particular
conception as regulative would impose on some the conceptions of others, and so deny at least to some
the freedom to advance their own conceptions.").
124. M. SANDEL, supra note 4, at 177 ("And as independent selves, we are free to choose our
purposes and ends unconstrained by such [a teleological] order, or by custom or tradition or inherited
status.").
125. Ackerman and Rawls think that law should he neutral in this fashion. See supra notes 121
& 123.
126. These dichotomies have been discussed at length elsewhere. I will describe them here only to
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trality: Although we have different and conflicting ideas of how to live,
the basic rules limiting our freedom of action can and should be set by
relatively non-controversial criteria. These criteria are relatively non-
controversial because they are based on shared interests that are indepen-
dent of considerations that cause us to have different notions of the good
life.
This political vision is non-neutral in the sense that it is value-laden. It
is squarely opposed to political visions that do not recognize the legitimacy
of individual pursuit of happiness or of conflicting notions of the good
life. 1 7 Yet it is powerful and persuasive to those who accept it precisely
because it appears to be value-neutral as between individuals with differ-
ent views of how to live. It appears to let everyone live as she likes, subject
only to minimal legal controls.128 The limits are minimal both in the sense
that they allow wide freedom of action and in the sense that they are
based on criteria that are theoretically less controversial than the criteria
underlying views of the good life.
1. The private realm and the pursuit of happiness. Unlike classical
and medieval political thought,129 classical liberalism does not define the
good life.130 The Declaration of Independence states that individuals have
the natural right "to pursue Happiness"; it does not define what it means
to be happy, and it does not tell individuals what they should do. They
are free, within legal limits, to do what they like.
In the private realm, individuals are free to pursue their subjective
desires. Those desires are assumed to be arbitrary in that they are unprin-
cipled: They are not constrained by any overarching theory that deter-
mines what one's desires should be, or that entitles one person's goals to
more respect than someone else's. Desires are also arbitrary in that they
the extent required by my argument about nihilism. For a more detailed examination of these dichoto-
mies, see M. SANDEL, supra note 4, at 2 (right/good); R. UNGERs, supra note 51, at 38-55 (reason/
desire); id. at 67-69 (rule/value); id. at 76-103 (law/morality; law/politics; objective/subjective); id.
at 125-37 (universal/particular); Kennedy, supra note 9, at 261-72 (public/private); id. at 286-89
(state/individual); id. at 294-99 (security/freedom of action); id. at 355-62 (altruism/individualism);
F. Olsen, The Sex of Law 1 (1983) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (rational/irrational;
reason/emotion; objective/subjective; abstract/contextualized; principled/personalized).
127. See, e.g., T. AquINAS, SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS (J. Dawson trans. 1959);
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS (J. Warrington trans. 1963); ARISTOTLE, PoLrrcs (E. Barker trans. 1946); ST.
AUGUSTINE, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE (H. Paolucci ed. 1962); CICERO, DE
REPUBLICA, DE LEGIBUS (C. Keyes trans. 1928); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (A. Bloom trans. 1968).
128. See M. WALZER, Nervous Liberals, in RADICAL PRINCIPLES: REFLECTIoNS OF AN UN-
RECONSTRUCTED DEMOCRAT 92, 95 (1980) ("The root conviction of liberal thought is that the unin-
hibited pursuit of private ends (subject only to minimal legal controls) will produce the greatest good
of the greatest number, and hence that every restraint on that pursuit is presumptively wrong.").
129. See supra note 127.
130. See R. UNGER, supra note 51, at 66 ("Freedom . . . is the power to choose arbitrarily the
ends and means of one's striving. In principle, nothing makes one man's goals worthier of success than
another's."); see also supra notes 123 & 124 (according to Sandel, people legitimately differ in their
conceptions of what happiness is and how to pursue it).
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are freely chosen; human beings create their own destinies unconfined by
any natural purpose other than satisfaction of desire.'31
Although individual value choices appear arbitrary and subjective from
the point of view of the state, the individual does not necessarily experi-
ence them as arbitrary. Thus, we can describe individual choice as either
subjective (unconstrained individual value choice) or as objective (individ-
ual rational maximization of satisfaction). Moreover, individuals may feel
constraints within the private realm of freedom (the pursuit of happiness);
the absence of government regulation allows "private" persons to exercise
power over each other.'3 2 Furthermore, the private realm is also the
sphere of morality, which is thought to contain certain universal principles
that constrain individual choice. Within the sphere of morality, some prin-
ciples are believed to be so fundamental (i.e., objective) that all people
should follow them (even though the state will not enforce them); other
principles are viewed as matters of individual (subjective) conscience.
Thus, the subjective element of the concept of neutrality (legal liberty to
pursue happiness) contains within itself the possibility of being described
as either subjective or objective.
2. The public realm and the rule of law. The liberal justification for
liberty is that individuals must be allowed to choose what they want to do
because they have different and potentially conflicting ways of pursuing
happiness. As long as individuals do not violate the boundaries of their
legal liberty by infringing on someone else's legal rights, they should be
allowed to do whatever makes them happy. Since it is illegitimate to im-
pose anyone's view of the good life on anyone else, the limits to freedom of
action must be defined by reference to criteria that are independent of
ordinary value conflicts that cause people to have different ideas of how to
live.'33 In defining legal rights (boundaries on legal liberty), liberal theo-
rists abandon the rhetoric about the pursuit of happiness and use rhetoric
about rational bases for the legal rules. At this level of abstraction, there is
therefore a gross disjunction between rhetoric about legal liberties and
rhetoric about legal rights.
Liberals base law in universal principles that can be demonstrated ra-
tionally, not on arbitrary desires of particular individuals or groups. To
131. R. UNGER, supra note 51, at 42-46; Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contri-
butions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1060-62 (1980).
132. See Cohen, supra note 60.
133. See M. SANDEL, supra note 4, at 1-11, 116; cf. id. at 1 ("[Slociety, being composed of a
plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged
when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the
good. . . .") (emphasis in original); R. UNGER, supra note 51, at 84 ("The justification of the laws
would consist in showing that the restraints put on men's struggle for comfort, power, and glory are
fair because no man's freedom is set without reason above another's and each man is allowed the
maximum freedom compatible with the prohibition of arbitrary preference.").
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the extent moral principles govern the private realm of individual freedom
of action, they fall into the category of the good. The principles that gov-
ern the public sphere of law fall into the category of the right."3 The
principles of the good are assumed to be more controversial than the prin-
ciples of the right. Traditional theorists presume the possibility of agree-
ment about the principles governing legal rights; they presume that
agreement about the principles of the good life is either impossible or un-
likely. They also assume that it is legitimate for there to be diverging
views of the good life, but that the legal system of rights and duties is
illegitimate unless it is based on principles about which we should theoret-
ically be able to come to agreement. 13 5
The asserted neutrality of legal rules limiting freedom of action there-
fore implicates the belief in the availability of rational decision procedures.
No one's freedom of action is limited by anyone else's particular, arbi-
trary, subjective, and value-laden ideas of the good life; shared interests
that can engender principled, objective, and rational legal rules provide
the limits to freedom of action. The liberal notion of legal rules requires a
procedure for deciding what the rules should be that is completely inde-
pendent of the controversial value judgments that cause us to have differ-
ent moral views.
3. Law and politics. The preceding discussion may be summarized
in a table. The terms on the left represent the more controversial, individ-
ualized, and open-ended components of our rhetoric about neutrality; the
terms on the right represent the supposedly less controversial, more ra-
tional and principled components of our rhetoric about neutrality.
Private Realm versus Public Realm
(The Good) (The Right)
desire reason






legal liberties legal rights
subjective objective
pursuit of happiness rule of law
134. See M. SANDEL, supra note 4, at 9-10.
135. As Sandel explains:
On the full deontological view, the primacy of justice describes not only a moral priority but
also a privileged form of justification; the right is prior to the good not only in that its claims
take precedence, but also in that its principles are independently derived. This means that,
unlike other practical injunctions, principles of justice are justified in a way that does not
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Traditional theorists recognize that substantial controversies exist about
the content of the legal rules.136 Nonetheless, they claim that those contro-
versies differ in character from the controversies about the good life. They
differ because rational techniques can resolve the legal controversies.
1 7
Differing value systems cause political and moral disagreement, but disa-
greement in law is explained by the claim that one or the other party to
the controversy has made a mistake, not by reference to conflicting
values.138
It is now possible to outline the relationships among the concepts of
determinacy, objectivity, and neutrality. I have argued that traditional the-
orists think of neutrality as the allowance of arbitrary freedom of action
(legal liberty) within state-imposed limits (legal rights and duties). The
limits on free actions are legitimate because they are both determined by
and based on objective criteria.
This simple picture breaks down, however. Both the concept of deter-
minacy and the concept of objectivity repeat within themselves the subjec-
tive/objective dichotomy that characterizes the concept of neutrality. The
subjective element of neutrality is the idea of legal liberty: Individuals
should be allowed to pursue their own conceptions of happiness, whatever
they are. 39 The objective element of neutrality is the idea of legal rights
or duties: Principles about which everyone should be able to agree impose
limits to freedom of action. In this view, both determinacy and objectivity
appear to be "objective."
As I argued earlier, however, prevalent notions of what determinacy
and objectivity mean contain potentially contradictory qualities. Prevalent
conceptions of objectivity are based on the idea of rational consensus,
which includes the separate ideas of consensus and reason, both of which
can appear to be either subjective or objective. Consensus appears subjec-
tive because we cannot know beforehand what the people involved will
want. Reason appears objective because it assumes one can identify princi-
ples that are intersubjectively valid. Consensus can appear objective be-
cause it is based on commonality and agreement rather than on individual
depend on any particular vision of the good. To the contrary: given its independent status, the
right constrains the good and sets its bounds.
Id. at 2. For an example of traditional thought on the relationship between principles of justice and
the good, see R. NozicK, supra note 14, at 271-73 (arguing that rules that generate unequal out-
comes are neutral if based on independent justifications).
136. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 126-27.
137. See id. at 72-74.
138. See id. at 128-30. See also ARISTOTLE, ETi-ics, supra note 127, at 133-39 (distinguishing
between theoretical and practical wisdom); J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-24 (J. Viertel
trans. 1973) (distinguishing between theoretical and practical interests).
139. As I have argued, legal liberty can also be described objectively as the rational maximization
of individual satisfaction.
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preferences; reason appears subjective because it places apparently arbi-
trary (or unfounded) limits on what people are allowed to want.
Notions of determinacy also encompass contradictions. Procedures for
deriving specific rules from objective principles require both determinacy
and indeterminacy. We need a certain amount of determinacy to allow us
to believe that objective principles actually tell us what to do. At the same
time, we need some indeterminacy to maintain the appearance of inter-
subjective validity. A fully determinate theory-a comprehensive set of
rigid rules that directs outcomes in all cases-does not appear to be objec-
tive because it presupposes a level of unanimity that does not exist. Con-
versely, the more objective a theory appears, the less determinate it can be,
because agreement about first principles is more likely to occur when they
are stated as general standards, rather than as specific rules. Thus, it ap-
pears that determinacy both creates an appearance of objectivity-by dem-
onstrating that valid first principles actually constrain judicial discretion
by telling judges what to do-and undermines the appearance of objectiv-
ity-by preventing judges from using the discretion needed to fit princi-
ples to specific cases.
Therefore, the notions of determinacy and objectivity both support and
undermine the central justificatory premise of the liberal social contract
view of the state, the notion of neutrality. All three concepts can be subdi-
vided into components that can be characterized as either objective or sub-
jective: neutrality (pursuit of happiness v. rational legal rules); objectivity
(reason v. consensus); determinacy (rigid rules v. flexible standards). All
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B. Transcending the Dichotomies.
Liberals believe decisions about legal rules must be made without con-
sideration of the values that cause us to have different views of the good
life. They argue that no one will be willing to obey legal rules limiting
her freedom of action unless those limits can be justified in a compelling
fashion. Since no one is justified in imposing her moral views on others,
the most compelling way to convince people to give up some of their legal
liberty is to base the limits to legal liberty on principles that all people
should theoretically accept.
While there is no way to prove that the distinctions between reason and
desire, and between law and politics, are false, it is possible to argue that
those dichotomies no longer serve a useful function. They are no longer
useful because they obscure important facts.
First, those distinctions obscure the extent to which views of the appro-
priate area of freedom determine what limits on freedom of action are
allowable. Views of morality contain within themselves permissible limits
on freedom of action. Hardly anyone thinks that the freedom to pursue
happiness includes the freedom to kill one's neighbors if they play their
stereos too loudly. One might argue that such an act would deprive the
neighbors of equal liberty to pursue happiness. But this argument begs
the question. The right to pursue happiness includes the right not to be
killed for such a flimsy reason. The very question, then, is where to draw
the line between freedom of action and limits on freedom of action. The
notion of the right to pursue happiness obscures the fact that it includes
within itself contradictory principles: freedom and control.
Second, the general distinctions between law and politics, between law
and morality, and between the good and the right obscure the extent to
which the particular dichotomies reappear within the legal system and
recur within categories that are subsidiary to the general distinctions.
140
The fact that the various dichotomies and contradictory categories occur
again and again within the realm of law means that no rational decision
procedure based on such distinctions is possible. The manipulation of
these categories and arguments related to them accounts for a great deal of
what we call "legal reasoning."'' Legal reasoning fails to transcend con-
140. Law itself is divided between legislation and adjudication. Traditional thinkers see legislation
as part of the political realm of arbitrary desire, subjective morality, and freedom of action; adjudica-
tion is apolitical and characterized by rational principles, objective decision procedures, and collective
control. But we sometimes think of the system of legislation as the result of naked power struggles,
sometimes as the result of policy science or economic analysis. And within the system of adjudication
of legal rules reappear the contradictions betweeen objective and subjective tests, between autonomy
and community, and between liberties and rights.
141. For an analysis of the way in which doctrinal manipulation operates in a specific context, see
Frug, supra note 8, at 1312-18 (arguing that corporate and administrative law doctrines are best
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tradictory value choices; it merely repeats and systematizes them. Because
it fails to resolve the contradictions, it cannot transcend the ordinary value
conflicts that cause people to have different views of the good life.
IV. NIHILISM
Why should it be possible to have grounds for believing anything if
it isn't possible to be certain?
-Ludwig Wittgenstein142
We should not regret our inability to perform a feat which no one
has any idea of how to perform.
-Richard Rorty' 43
A. Reason and Tyranny
At this point in any conversation I have had with someone who believes
that legal theory has a rational foundation, I have always been asked the
same series of questions: If you are right that legal reasoning has no ob-
jective basis and you have no general theory that tells us what we should
do in particular cases, how do you figure out what is the right thing to
do? Do you just "grok" the answer? 144 Do you do just what you like?
The fact that I am always asked these questions is instructive. It sug-
understood as mediating devices designed to mask unresolved, underlying value choices).
142. L. WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 110, at 48e (italics in original).
143. R. RoRTv, supra note 13, at 340.
144. Robert Heinlein uses the word "grok" to describe accurate intuition:
"'Grok' means 'identically equal.' The human clichE. 'This hurts me worse than it does you'
has a Martian flavor. The Martians seem to know instinctively what we learned painfully
from modern physics, that observer interacts with observed through the process of observation.
'Grok' means to understand so thoroughly that the observer becomes a part of the observed-to
merge, blend, intermarry, lose identity in group experience."
R. HEINLEIN, STRANGER IN A STRANGE LAND 213-14 (1968). Grokking requires us to assume both
that an accurate answer exists and that we can accurately perceive it. The process of getting the
answer, however, cannot be described; it can only be experienced.
David James Duncan has recently described a similar human capacity as "native intelligence":
Native intelligence develops through an unspoken or soft-spoken relationship with . . . inter-
woven things: it evolves as the native involves himself in his region. A non-native awakes in
the morning in a body in a bed in a room in a building on a street in a county in a state in a
nation. A native awakes in the center of a little cosmos-or a big one, if his intelligence is
vast-and he wears this cosmos like a robe, senses the barely perceptible shiftings, migrations,
moods and machinations of its creatures, its growing green things, its earth and sky. Native
intelligence is what Huck Finn had rafting the Mississippi, what Thoreau had by his pond,
what Kerouac had in Desolation Lookout and lost entirely the instant he caught a whiff of any
city. But some have it in cities-like the Artful Dodger, picking his way through a crowd of
London pockets; like Mother Teresa in the Calcutta slums. Sissy Hankshaw had it on free-
ways, Woody Guthrie in crowds of fruit pickers, Gandhi in jails. Almost everybody has a dab
of it wherever he or she feels most at home.
D. DUNCAN, supra note 4, at 53-54 (emphasis in original).
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gests that they incorporate the most fundamental assumptions of tradi-
tional theory and that those assumptions are widely held. Moreover, these
questions demonstrate the concerns that make people believe that legal
reasoning is based on a rational foundation. As Rorty puts it, this is "the
fear that there really is no middle ground between matters of taste and
matters capable of being settled by a previously statable algorithm."""
The unstated premise behind this fear is the idea that we are entitled to
have an opinion only if we can back it up by a method for deciding legal
and moral questions that can compel agreement by its inherent rationality.
If we do not have a rational foundation for our moral beliefs, we are not
entitled to have an opinion, or our opinion is not entitled to be taken
seriously. And if we do not believe in the possibility of using reason to
adjudicate value conflicts, we have given up on morality and law entirely.
If it is not at least theoretically possible to be certain, it is impossible to
believe anything at all.
This position is not new. It resembles the attacks on legal realism. The
legal realists systematically and powerfully attacked formalistic, deductive
methods of legal reasoning."" The strand of contemporary Critical Legal
Studies that focuses on demonstrating the contradictions and indetermi-
nacy in legal theory is an extension of this aspect of legal realism." 7 The
critics of legal realism seized on Llewellyn's maxim that the law is what
officials do about disputes."" Morris Cohen and others concluded that
this form of positivism "naturally leads to the assumption that what is, is
right." 149 If law is simply what judges say it is, and values have no ra-
tional basis, we have no way to criticize what the government does. The
only appropriate response is complacence.
Some of the critics of legal realism, such as Lon Fuller, argued that the
absence of any rational basis for values and legal reason "logically left
physical force as the only arbiter of human affairs."' 50 The inability to
prove that any view was better than any other view apparently led not
only to complacent acceptance of the status quo but to the idea that might
was right. 5 ' Without any rational standards to restrain human behavior,
145. R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 336.
146. See E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND
THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-94 (1973) (discussing the legal realist critique of traditional legal
thought).
147. See Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1673-74, 1679-82 (1982) (analyzing relationship between
Critical Legal scholarship and legal realism).
148. E. PURCELL, supra note 146, at 161.
149. Cohen, Book Review, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 171, 177 (1936) (reviewing E. ROBINSON, LAW
AND THE LAWYERS (1935)); see also E. PURCELL, supra note 146, at 92, 161 (discussing Cohen's
philosophical critique of legal realism).
150. E. PURCELL, supra note 146, at 163 (describing Fuller's position).
151. See PLATO, GORGIAS 78 (W. Hamilton trans. 1971) ("[N]ature . . . herself demonstrates
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the government would rule not because it was just but because it monopo-
lized the use of force. Without any external standard of adjudication,
value disputes would be solved not by discussion and agreement but by the
application of governmental power. The critics of legal realism further
argued that it not only led to complacence and deference to the powerful
but also led logically to a particular form of government-totalitarianism.
As Roscoe Pound said, "The political and juristic preaching of today leads
logically to [political] absolutism. ' 152 If there is no rational way to prove
that certain actions are wrong, the powerful will do what they want. And
since the government monopolizes the legitimate use of force, it will feel
no constraints on what it does; it will assert complete power over every-
one, and there are no horrors that it will not perpetrate with impunity.
The critics of legal realism concluded that legal realism led logically to
Nazism and Stalinism.
Current discussions about Critical Legal Studies and nihilism are not
identical to the old discussions about the relation between legal realism
and totalitarianism. But the similarities are enough to give a sense of d~jb
vu. I want to flesh out a little more what I think people mean when they
say that Critical Legal Studies leads us into the abyss of nihilism. We can
then get a clearer sense of what they fear and can better judge whether
their fears are justified.
The crux of the argument is that both the good life and just government
require a rational foundation. Without a rational method to adjudicate
value conflicts, nothing is certain. Everything is up for grabs. We do not
know what to do because we are left free to choose. And freedom of
choice, according to this view, is dangerous in two potentially contradic-
tory ways.
First, there is the danger of uncertainty. Uncertainty will affect moral-
ity, private law, and public law. Uncertainty will affect morality because
we will not know how to live a good life. If reason cannot adjudicate value
conflicts, we will not know what to do. If living a good life means doing
what we are supposed to do, rather than what we feel like doing, we must
have a way to figure out rationally what to do. Without reason, we cannot
figure out which of our preferences are good and which are bad; we are
left free to do what we like.
Perhaps more important, we do not know what other people are going
to do. Without reason, we are relegated to passion or desire. Under one
that it is right that the better man should prevail over the worse and the stronger over the weaker.");
THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 331 (J. Finley trans. 1951) ("'[R]ight, as the world goes,
is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer
what they must.'") (quoting the Athenian response to the Melian commissioners).
152. R. POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY 9 (1940).
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version of liberalism, this means that individuals want different and un-
predictable things. They pursue happiness in surprising and diverse ways.
And some of the things they will want to do will affect us and interfere
with the things we want to do. This creates an uncomfortable level of
insecurity.
The effect of uncertainty on private law is similar to its effect on moral-
ity. Judges who adjudicate conflicts between individuals often have to
choose between incompatible and conflicting life plans. Under the liberal
view, individuals have the right to pursue happiness, but conflicts arise
when someone does something that someone else finds objectionable. The
judge has to determine which person will be allowed to be happy: the one
who wants freedom to act or the one who wants security from harm.
Moreover, judges have their own personal views of how to pursue happi-
ness. Without any rational way to adjudicate the conflict, judges will ei-
ther impose their personal views or will act in a manner that is unpredict-
able. Without legal reasoning, judges will not know what to do, and we
will not know what the legal system will do to us if we try to do what
makes us happy.
A similar uncertainty will characterize public law disputes between in-
dividuals and government entities. If reason does not tell the judge or the
president or the legislator or the town councilor what to do, we will never
know what they are going to do to us. We face the same insecurity as in
private law.
Second, there is the danger of predatory conduct. In an alternative view
of liberalism, it is not true that individuals have diverse ways of pursuing
happiness. Everyone wants the same things: wealth, power, and prestige.
And all of these things can be obtained only at the expense of others.
While it is true that some people are content with less wealth, power, and
prestige than others, there are enough people who want them in such
great amounts that if we let these people do what they wanted, they
would grab everything from us.153 Giving up reason as a basis for moral-
ity will lead not to uncertainty, but rather to unrestrained competition for
153. Individual self-assertion affects morality by splitting our moral lives in two. On the one
hand, we are concerned with living a good life. This means doing what we ought to do. We associate
this with kindness, religion, family life, and friendship. See Olsen, supra note 14, at 1499-1528. Liv-
ing a good life means acting toward others as we would like them to act toward us. On the other
hand, most of us have been taught to desire the good life. Living the good life means being wealthy
and powerful. We associate this mode of behavior with public life outside the home-with the sphere
of politics and the market. See id. at 1520-22. We expect people in those situations to be competitive,
individualistic, and predatory. In the absence of a rational foundation for a good life, nothing will
restrain people from trying to live the good life. Under this view, the result of giving up the idea of a
rational basis for morality is that our public moral code of individualistic self-assertion will replace
our private moral code of kindness and altruism.
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wealth and power, or as Hobbes put it, the "time of Warre, where every
man is Enemy to every man."'"
Giving up reason as a basis for legal reasoning will have a similar effect
on private law. Without a rational basis for holding that individual acts to
maximize wealth, power, and prestige are wrong, the judge will have no
basis for restraining anyone's conduct. Since law involves restraint on
freedom of action, the absence of a rational basis for law will cause judges
to abandon all legal rules that protect us from being harmed by others.
Again, we will have the war of all against all.
In public law, we are even worse off. Without any rational basis to
restrain governmental actions, government, like private individuals, will
maximize its wealth and power. Such a government will not worry about
prestige; it will worry only about being feared.155 Thus, without reason to
serve as the basis for restraint, we get a government that does not restrain
itself: in other words, totalitarianism. And without a rational foundation
for constitutional theory, we have no basis for saying that such a govern-
ment is evil.
The upshot of all this is that traditional legal theorists assume that if
we do not believe that reason can adjudicate value conflicts and determine
the legitimacy of governmental actions, we are relegated to arbitrariness,
insecurity, physical and emotional harm, and tyranny. These horribles
cause traditional legal theorists to attack Critical Legal Studies as nihilis-
tic. They assume that we face a simple choice: We can believe in an objec-
tive, determinate, and neutral decision procedure for moral and legal
questions, or we can resign ourselves to shouting matches. Shouting
matches lead to shoving matches, and shoving matches lead to calamity.
B. Conversation and Responsibility
1. Moral confidence. Legal reasoning, as I understand it, consists of
conversation. Legal reasoning is not an accurate representation of natural
rights or sovereign commands. It is not the expression of an innate
antecedently existing decision procedure of rational consensus that unites
all persons involved in legal discourse. Traditional legal theorists assume
that if legal reasoning is neither accurate representation nor an intersub-
jective decision procedure, then we are left intolerably free to say
anything.
This fear is not surprising. Conversations are often free-wheeling. They
can take unexpected and dangerous turns. Nonetheless, rejection of the
154. T. HOBBES, supra note 82, at 186.
155. See N. MACHIAVELI, THE PRINCE 90 (L. Ricci trans. 1952) (1st ed. Florence 1513) ("The
reply is that [the prince] ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go
together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be wanting.").
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metaphors of accurate representation and decision procedures does not
logically require us to become agnostic about all our moral and political
values. To assume that it does unnecessarily and illogically pegs commit-
ment to a privileged form of justification. Adoption of the metaphor of
conversation does not logically commit us to anything in particular. It
does, however, allow us consciously to assume responsibility for what we
do.
When I convince someone that her theory did not compel her to reach
the normative results she advocated, she does not immediately give up all
her moral beliefs or her political positions. She continues to hold certain
beliefs deeply despite an inability to derive them logically from principles
that are grounded in reason or consensus. And she is right to do so.
2. The substance of nihilism. As a normative theory, nihilism is not
contentless. Nihilism as a moral theory is not simply a negation of every
other theory; it is, instead, the view that it does not matter what we be-
lieve, and that no one is entitled to say that anyone else is wrong. Tradi-
tional legal theorists fear that adopting the metaphor of conversation as a
description of legal reasoning logically requires the moral vacuum of ni-
hilism. But that metaphor hardly requires such a substantive result; it also
does not require the various consequences commonly assumed to flow
from it-indifference, personal imposition, majority rule, totalitarianism,
or doing just what you like.
3. Indifference. The idea that our moral beliefs are neither grounded
in nature or reason nor logically derived from general principles does not
force us to adopt nihilism; we are not required to believe that we should
have no beliefs or that it does not matter what we believe. People can hold
moral beliefs deeply without believing that they are "true" or "grounded
in reason." Our legal and philosophical discourse has confused the issue of
whether a belief is justified with the issue of whether it is true.
15
1
Many fear that if we give up the idea of rational decision procedures,
nothing will be left. But the metaphor of conversation does not require us
to become indifferent to what happens around us. It could require indif-
ference only if morality required decision procedures. But morality cannot
require anything because it is an abstraction, and abstractions are what
156. See R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 333-34 ("This confusion is aided by our use of 'objective'
to mean both 'characterizing the view which would be agreed upon as a result of argument un-
deflected by irrelevant considerations' and 'representing things as they really are.'"); id. at 383 ("This
attempt to answer questions of justification by discovering new objective truths, to answer the moral
agent's request for justifications with descriptions of a privileged domain, is the philosopher's special
form of bad faith-his special way of substituting pseudo-cognition for moral choice."); id. at 9 ("If
we have a Deweyan conception of knowledge, as what we are justified in believing, then we will not
imagine that there are enduring constraints on what can count as knowledge, since we will see 'justifi-
cation' as a social phenomenon rather than a transaction between 'the knowing subject' and
'reality.'").
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we make them. Virtue may not be knowledge, but it certainly is not cal-
lous indifference. Why? Because I assert it to be so. What we do and
believe matters. It does not matter that I cannot prove this to be so; what
matters is the human assertion of responsibility.
4. Personal imposition. Giving up the metaphor of rational decision
procedures also does not mean that judges will impose their personal
views of the good life on others. We are the heirs of three hundred years
of rhetoric about individual freedom of action and the right of individuals
to pursue their own conceptions of happiness. People (including judges)
will not immediately give up this ideal merely because it is not based on a
rational foundation or because we cannot prove that it is a position that
reasonable people would accept if they thought about it.
It is true, however, that judges impose their personal views of law. It
could hardly be otherwise. Judges do not all agree on what the legal rules
should be. Enough dissents are written to demonstrate this. Under the
traditional view, disagreement is evidence of mistake on one side or the
other. In my view, disagreement is evidence of disagreement about what
the rules should be, and nothing more.
5. Majority rule. Some legal realists became so disillusioned with
the idea of moral conversation that they believed they were forced, as a
matter of logic, to defer on all issues to the will of the legislature or the
politically powerful. 157 The retreat of these realists to the dictates of the
majority is logically incoherent. Majority rule possesses no privileged posi-
tion in a moral skeptic's universe. The fear of judicial tyranny is that, in
the absence of objective and principled limits on what judges do, judges
will interfere too much with the legislature. The goal is a principled divi-
sion of labor between the courts and the legislature. The lack of a princi-
ple-moral skepticism-cannot logically require acceptance of the princi-
ple of deference to the majority.
The answer to this conundrum is for judges to resort to ad hoc, contex-
tualized judgments about the division of power between judges and legis-
lators. Sometimes judges should defer to the expressed will of the legisla-
ture; at other times they should overrule it. Sometimes judges should fall
to provide remedies for injured plaintiffs in the absence of any legislative
direction; at other times, they should provide remedies without waiting for
legislative action. The idea that we do not have a decision procedure for
solving legal questions does not mean either that judges should always
defer to the legislature in creating and defining legal rights or that judges
157. See E. PURCELL, supra note 146, at 197-217; see also International News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248-67 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (elaborating philosophy of deference to
legislatures).
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should ignore the legislature. It simply means that judges have to make
judgments about the proper exercise of their power in specific cases.
6. Totalitarianism. The same incoherence infects the idea that the
metaphor of conversation leads to totalitarianism. The critics of legal real-
ism asked: Who is to say what government does is wrong? If there is no
way to demonstrate rational limits to government power, government will
exert unlimited power.15 But this does not follow. If there are no rational
limits to the legitimate exercise of government power, there are also no
rational reasons for exercising that power at all. The idea that govern-
ment may legitimately do anything, including exercise absolute control
over everyday life and thought, is a principle; the idea is not neutral. It
does not make sense to say that open-ended conversation logically leads to
political absolutism. We could just as easily go the other way: The ab-
sence of a rational basis for government power could mean that we should
have no government at all. But a nihilist will have no greater reason for
advocating anarchy than for advocating totalitarianism.
Traditional theorists have therefore confused the issue of restraint of
governmental power with the issue of the epistemological foundations of
those restraints. They have assumed that those restraints will be insuffi-
ciently certain without a belief in their rational necessity and determinacy.
But to argue against the idea that moral or political or legal principles
have an epistemological foundation is not to argue against restraints on
governmental power. It is also not to argue that individual official deci-
sions should be made by whim. Giving up the idea that reason can adjudi-
cate value conflicts does not require us logically to support either unlim-
ited governmental power or unlimited legislative power. It simply requires
us to make judgments about the legitimacy of various exercises of govern-
mental power.
7. Doing just what you like. The horror of people doing just what
they like is based on two ideas. The first is that what people really like is
doing horrible things to each other. If we let them do just what they like,
they will all choose to be awful to each other. We impose law on them to
require them to refrain from doing these horrible things. And since judges
are people, if we let judges do just what they want, they would inevitably
exercise judicial power in oppressive ways.
But people do not want just to be beastly to each other. To suppose so
is to ignore facts. People want freedom to pursue happiness. But they also
want not to harm others or be harmed themselves. The evidence is all
around us that people are often caring, supportive, loving, and altruistic,
both in their family lives and in their relations with strangers.
158. E. PURCELL, supra note 146, at 161-62.
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It is also not true that, if left to do "just what they like," government
officials will necessarily harm us or oppress us. They may do these things
if that is what they want to do. But it is simply not the case that all
government officials admire Hitler and Stalin and use them as role
models.
Posing the question as whether people should do "just what they want"
is an effort to scare us into accepting the idea that reason can adjudicate
value conflicts. The underlying message of the question is that if you re-
ject the idea that there is a logic to value choice, then you have given up
the right to criticize barbarism. But this does not follow. Moreover, belief
in the existence of a logic of value choice does not necessarily protect us
from barbarism. The Nazis had their philosophers and they were not le-
gal realists. What protects us against Nazism is not the belief that reason
can prove that it is wrong. What protects us is outrage.
The second idea is that "just what you like" will not correspond to the
"good." Doing just what you like is acting randomly or on the basis of
feeling rather than knowledge. People should not do what they want to
do. They should follow their reason, which will tell them accurately what
is and is not good. The problem with this view is that there is no "idea of
the good" out there, waiting to be discovered. "Doing just what you like"
is redundant-there is nothing else to do but what you like.159
Rorty deals with this issue by distinguishing two senses of the word
"good." The first is the one used by philosopher's since it was invented by
Plato. Good refers to the rational foundation on which all important val-
ues are assumed to rest."1 0 The second sense of "good" is the way we use
it in everyday discourse to compliment something or someone. In this
more humdrum sense, we recognize that our judgments may change over
time and that they are based on intuition and considered judgment rather
than syllogism. Abandoning the metaphor of accurate representation or
decision procedures does not leave us with nothing. As Rorty explains:
There is . . . an ordinary sense of "good," the sense the word has
when used to commend-to remark that something answers to some
159. Robert Pirsig has made a similar point:
Then he saw it. He brought out the knife and excised the one word that created the entire
angering effect of that sentence. The word was "just." Why should Quality be just what you
like? Why should "what you like" be "just"? 'What did "just" mean in this case? When
separated out like this for independent examination it became apparent that "just" in this case
really didn't mean a damn thing. It was a purely pejorative term, whose logical contribution to
the sentence was nil. Now, with that word removed, the sentence became "Quality is what you
like," and its meaning was entirely changed. It had become an innocuous truism.
R. PsItSo, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 226-27 (1974) (emphasis in
original).
160. R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 306-07.
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interest. In this sense, too, one is not going to find a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions for goodness which will enable one to find
the Good Life, resolve moral dilemmas, grade apples, or whatever.
There are too many different sorts of interests to answer to, too
many kinds of things to commend and too many different reasons for
commending them, for such a set of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions to be found ...
N .. obody thinks that there are necessary and sufficient condi-
tions which will pick out, for example, the unique referent of "the
best thing for her to have done on finding herself in that rather em-
barrassing situation," though plausible conditions can be given
which will shorten a list of competing incompatible candidates. Why
should it be different for the referents of "what she should have done
in that ghastly moral dilemma" or "the Good Life for man" or
"what the world is really made of?"1 '
The answer to the question-"Do you do just what you want?"-is
yes. The problem is that neither the question nor the answer tells us any-
thing. The way the question is posed assumes that either we apply a deci-
sion procedure that is sufficiently determinate to generate an answer that
can compel agreement by its inherent rationality, or we are relegated to
tossing a coin. But those simply are not the only choices available to us:
The absence of a decision procedure for moral dilemmas does not require
us to act randomly or viciously. Traditional legal theory assumes that mo-
rality is a matter of truth, and that disagreement about moral questions is
therefore always a matter of mistake or bad faith. I view legal and moral
questions as matters to be answered by experience, emotion, introspection,
and conversation, rather than by logical proof.1 2 The question then be-
comes how we are supposed to make up our minds and whether my view
leaves anything at all for legal theory to do.
161. Id. at 307, 373-74.
162. See Gabel, supra note 61, at 312 (arguing that Ronald Dworkin seeks to reduce "all ques-
tions of justice to questions of logical technique").
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V. LEGAL THEORY
"Never again," cried the man, "never again will we wake up in
the morning and think Who am I? What is my purpose in life? Does
it really, cosmically speaking, matter if I don't get up and go to
work? For today we will finally learn once and for all the plain and




Where could I go, yet leave myself behind?
-Saint Augustine164
A. Edification
What shall we do then about legal theory? I think we should abandon
the idea that what we are supposed to be doing is applying or articulating
a rational method that will tell us once and for all (or even for our gener-
ation) what we are supposed to believe and how we are supposed to live.
We should no longer view the project of giving a "rational foundation" for
law as a worthwhile endeavor. If morality and law are matters of convic-
tion rather than logic, we have no reason to be ashamed that our deeply
felt beliefs have no "basis" that can be demonstrated through a rational
decision procedure or that we cannot prove them to be "true" or "right."
Rorty has distinguished between two broad types of theory: systematic
and edifying.165 Systematic philosophers build systems of thought that
they claim explain large bodies of material, guide theoretical development,
and generate answers to difficult questions. Systematizers can be either
normal or revolutionary philosophers. The normal systematizers work
within established tradition; the revolutionary systematizers seek to re-
place the established paradigm with a new, better, or truer paradigm of
thought. Both try to establish a framework that will set bounds on the
legitimate content of discourse.
Edifying philosophers, on the other hand, seek to shake the rug out
from under existing normal or abnormal systems of thought. They seek to
make us doubt the necessity and coherence of our views. They seek to free
us from feeling that we have "gotten" the answer and that we no longer
need to question ourselves about what we stand for. Edifying philosophers
do not seek to induce people to give up their moral views. They do not
163. D. ADAMS, supra note 38, at 176-77 (emphasis in original).
164. ST. AUGUSTiNE, CONFESSIONS 78 (R. Pine-Coffin trans. 1961).
165. See R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 357-94 (contrasting systematic and edifying philosophies).
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argue against profound political commitment. Rather, they strive to make
us realize that our views are matters of commitment rather than
knowledge."' 6
Legal scholars can perform an edifying role by broadening the per-
ceived scope of legitimate institutional alternatives.16 ' One way to do this
is to demonstrate the contingent and malleable nature of legal reasoning
and legal institutions. The greatest service that legal theorists can provide
is active criticism of the legal system. Criticism is initially reactive and
destructive, rather than constructive. But our mistaken belief that our cur-
rent ways of doing things are somehow natural or necessary hinders us
from envisioning radical alternatives to what exists. To exercise our uto-
pian imagination, it is helpful first to expose the structures of thought that
limit our perception of what is possible. Judges rationalize their decisions
as the results of reasoned elaboration of principles inherent in the legal
system. Instead of choosing among available descriptions, theories, vocabu-
laries, and courses of action, the official who feels "bound" reasons from
nonexistent "grounds" and hides from herself the fact that she is exercis-
ing power."6 ' By systematically and constantly criticizing the rationaliza-
166. Rorty comments:
[Tihe point of edifying philosophy is to keep the conversation going rather than to find objec-
tive truth. Such truth, in the view I am advocating, is the normal result of normal discourse.
Edifying philosophy is not only abnormal but reactive, having sense only as a protest against
attempts to close off conversation by proposals for universal commensuration through the hy-
postatization of some privileged set of descriptions. The danger which edifying discourse tries
to avert is that some given vocabulary, some way in which people might come to think of
themselves, will deceive them into thinking that from now on all discourse could be, or should
be, normal discourse. The resulting freezing-over of culture would be, in the eyes of edifying
philosophers, the dehumanization of human beings.
Id. at 377.
Richard Bernstein argues that Rorty's distinction between systematic and edifying philosophy is a
rhetorical device "employed to cure us of the expectation that philosophy must be 'constructive,' must
be conceived of as a form of inquiry that provides us with foundations." R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8,
at 202.
167. The range of legal actions perceived as legitimate changes over time. Scholars can help ex-
pand that range. The actions of participants in the legal system can also alter perceptions of legiti-
macy. For example, Judge Paul Garrity of the Superior Court of Massachusetts recently ruled that
conditions at the Essex County Jail in Lawrence, Massachusetts violated the constitutional protection
against cruel and unusual punishment. He gave the county officials six months to remedy conditions.
His decision to impose a six-month deadline was overturned on appeal, and the case was remanded to
Judge Garrity for further proceedings. Garrity refused to comply with that decision. He quit the case.
See King, Garrity cites morality in quitting case, Boston Globe, Sept. 9, 1983, at 1, col. 3. To my
knowledge this behavior is unprecedented. Because it was unusual, it predictably received considerable
publicity and stirred significant controversy. Whether one sees Garrity's action as legitimate or illegit-
imate, it permanently altered the legal system in the United States: As a factual matter, judges are far
more likely to do something if someone else (even one other judge) has done it first. By doing some-
thing unconventional, one judge provides a precedent that others can use in later crises. The pool of
available responses by judges has been broadened.
168. Rorty makes a similar point in his discussion of Sartre:
From Sartre's point of view, the urge to find such necessities is the urge to be rid of one's
freedom to erect yet another alternative theory or vocabulary. Thus the edifying philosopher
who points out the incoherence of the urge is treated as a "relativist," one who lacks moral
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tions of traditional legal reasoning, we can demonstrate, again and again,
that a wider range of alternatives is available to us.
I therefore advocate the persistent demonstration in all doctrinal fields
that both the legal rules in force and the arguments that are presented to
justify and criticize them are incoherent.' 9 They are incoherent because
they are constructed in ways that make it impossible for them to satisfy
their own claims to determinacy, objectivity and neutrality." Legal the-
ory is at war with itself. This kind of criticism would be useful even if we
could not imagine a satisfactory alternative to traditional legal theory.
Such criticism reminds us that legal theory cannot answer the question of
how we are going to live together. We are going to have to answer that
question ourselves.
B. Reconstruction
The demonstration that legal theory is incoherent is often thought to
leave us with a void. How do we figure out what to do? I believe this
question has an answer, but it is not the kind of answer that traditional
legal theorists have come to expect. The answer is not to divide the world
into the realms of objective and subjective, rational and irrational. As
Hans Meyerhoff has argued, we should reject the idea that "[e]ither phi-
losophy is the Truth (with a capital T) or it is nothing-(or it is 'Sophis-
try').17'' We are not destined to live in a world in which we must choose
between believing in some ultimate permanent foundation for law and
morality (rationalism) or believing that all views are as good as all others
and it does not matter what we believe or do (nihilism).17 2 We need to get
seriousness, because he does not join in the common human hope that the burden of choice will
pass away.
R. RORTY, supra note 13, at 376.
169. For other defenses of the practice of criticism of legal reasoning, see Freeman, Truth and
Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981); Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV.
293 (1984).
170. This does not necessarily mean that the existing rules are bad. It means that their goodness
or badness depends on political or moral judgments, rather than "reason."
171. Meyerhoff, From Socrates to Plato, in THE CRITICAL SPIRIT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HER-
BERT MARCUSE 187, 201 (K. Wolff & B. Moore eds. 1967). See also R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at
18 ("Either there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot
escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.")
(emphasis in original); 0. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 58-59 (1982) (describing the difference
between "either/or" views of morality and contextual judgments).
172. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 2-3, 18 (1983). Rorty agrees:
"Relativism" is the view that every belief on a certain topic, or perhaps about any topic, is as
good as every other. No one holds this view. Except for the occasional cooperative freshman,
one cannot find anybody who says that two incompatible opinions on an important topic are
equally good. The philosophers who get called "relativists" are those who say that the grounds
for choosing between opinions are less algorithmic than had been thought.. . . So the real
issue is not between people who think one view is as good as another and people who do not.
It is between those who think our culture, or purpose, or intuitions cannot be supported except
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over the feeling that a view is either one that all persons should accept
because it is grounded in reality or it is "just your opinion." The proper
question is not "how can we be certain that we are right?" but "how
should we live?" 1 3
The fact that contemporary legal theory is internally contradictory is
not, by itself, something to bemoan. The contradictory principles in legal
reasoning accurately reflect the fact that we have conflicting goals and we
are not at all sure how to reconcile them. Traditional legal theory is objec-
tionable, not because it is contradictory, but because it claims to give us
determinate, objective, and neutral decision procedures to resolve the con-
tradictions. None of these things is true: Legal theory is far more indeter-
minate and open-ended than its adherents claim, and it expresses contro-
versial political and moral commitments rather than universal principles
grounded in human rationality.
Theory expresses our values; it does not create or determine them.17'
Theory is useful to the extent that it articulates what we value. Since our
values conflict, legal theories express our competing values.' 75 We "draw
a line" between competing principles and then create a theory to describe
where we chose to place the line. But the theory does not itself reconcile
those values or tell us where to draw the line. It cannot because it is
something we made up to express those values and the "line" between
them. To think otherwise is to reify theory, to remove it from human
control and to pretend that it is telling us what to do. But it cannot tell us
what to do-we created it. I am not suggesting that theory is meaningless.
As I argued earlier, it can structure our thinking in a way that limits our
perception of the available alternatives. But it is important to remember
that this is because we structured it to do this. We told ourselves what to
do.
Criticism cannot magically generate answers. Internal criti-
cism-criticism that uses a paradigm's criteria against the paradigm it-
self-merely shows that a certain theory does not do what it purports to
do. For example, demonstrating that a theory that claims to be determi-
nate is in fact indeterminate is purely negative; this sort of demonstration
conversationally, and people who still hope for other sorts of support.
Id. at 201 (quoting Rorty, Pragmatisn, Relativism and Irrationalismn, 53 PRoc. & ADDRESSES AM.
PHIL. ASS'N 727-28 (1980)).
173. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 203 ("It means turning away from the obsession 'to get
things right' and turning our attention to coping with the contingencies of human life.").
174. For elaborations of this point, see D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUC-
TION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 82-84 (1983); R. RORTY, supra note 13,
at 359.
175. For a rich, contextualized analysis of contrasting social visions, see Peter Arenella's discus-
sion of criminal law, Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983).
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does not then tell us how the theory can be made determinate or whether
we should be interested in determinate theories at all.
On the other hand, external criticism-criticism that challenges the
fundamental assumptions of a mode of discourse (Rorty's "abnormal" dis-
course)-also cannot generate answers. Any alternative premises that
might be the basis of a new paradigm have already been assumed before
the critique began. Thus, the external critique of the old paradigm does
not give us anything new except a striking contrast with the new para-
digm we have already invented.
We cannot expect the new to emerge phoenix-like from the old. Tradi-
tional legal theorists have assumed that theory is, or should be determina-
tive-that the goal of theory is to generate answers. For this view to make
sense, we must believe that it is possible to find out what to do by think-
ing in the right way. It is possible to caricature this view of theory as the
belief that important questions about life can be answered by use of a
formula, a mechanical decision procedure. As I have explained, however,
the sophisticated versions of this view of normative theory are not
mechanical at all: They explicitly account for the active role of the theorist
in decisionmaking. They even combine in ingenious ways elements of both
determinacy and indeterminacy, objectivity and subjectivity, to give us the
sense that theory constrains our choices only to the extent constraint is
desirable and allows innovative judgment and flexibility only to the extent
those qualities are desirable .17 But in the end, all the sophisticated ver-
sions of theory that seek to describe it as a decision procedure based on a
sure foundation are supremely unconvincing; they cannot convince pre-
cisely because they are so sophisticated. The dilemma comes down to this:
For a theory to generate answers, it must be mechanical, yet no mechani-
cal theory can render an adequate account of our experience of legitimate
moral choice. We cannot even escape the dilemma by trying to make some
of our choices (the "core") mechanical and some (the "periphery") open-
ended: No mechanical choices appear to be unequivocally valid. Moreover,
the history of legal thought has repeatedly demonstrated that any indeter-
minacy in a theory fatally undermines the appearance of determinacy
elsewhere; if the theory really contains indeterminate principles, someone
who opposes a rule or an outcome within the supposedly determinate,
objective core will inevitably use an open-ended standard to reopen an
issue that was supposed to have been laid permanently to rest, and the
theory itself will enable her to do this.
The way out of this seemingly hopeless situation is simply to give up
176. Cf J. CROWLEY, LrrrLE, BIG 90 (1983) ("A sort of Calvinist dogma, where you never
knew when you were right, but must be constantly vigilant against error.").
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both the assumption that the proper role of legal theory is to generate
answers and the concomitant assumption that no moral or legal choices
are legitimate unless they are generated by an abstract formula. The for-
mulas that have been proposed by legal theorists have been ingenious, but
essentially wrongheaded. Whether they take the form of balancing tests or
sophisticated Rawlsian social contract theory or wealth maximization,
they have all sought to convince us that they could do something that is
impossible: give us answers without illegitimately relieving us of the bur-
den of moral choice. No theory can legitimately choose our moral ends for
us; we should not want theory to do this for us.
How then do we make value choices? The desperation with which peo-
ple ask this question rests on the assumption that legal rules obtain
whatever legitimacy they have by being chosen in a way that is essentially
different from the way in which we make everyday moral decisions. By
now it should be clear that I do not think that there is a difference. And
this revelation should not be experienced as leaving us helpless; rather, it
should be experienced as empowering us.
Everyone has had the experience of making important, difficult moral
decisions. And almost no one does it by applying a formula. When people
decide whether to get married, to have children, to go to law school, to
move to another state, to quit their jobs, they do not apply a theory to
figure out what to do. They do not "balance all the factors" or add up the
pros and cons. In short, they do not follow a procedure that generates, by
itself, an answer. They do think long and hard about what they want in
life; they imagine what their lives would be like if they were to follow one
path rather than another; they talk with the people who are most impor-
tant to them and whose opinions they value; they argue with others and
with themselves; and in the end, they make a decision. And later, in look-
ing back at it, they are sometimes pleased with their decisions, sometimes
not. But they knew how to do it.
Everyone knows how to do this. Some people do it better than others,
because they know more facts, or because they are not afraid of asking
their friends for advice, or because they consider what to do more care-
fully than others. But it is in any event an experience that everyone has
had. Legal decisions-deciding a case, voting on a statute, electing a presi-
dent-are no different: Judging, in whatever context it appears, is just
decisionmaking. Of course, we may act differently in different roles. We
might believe that it is improper for a judge to do something that a legis-
lator could legitimately do; we might not say something in a classroom as
a teacher that we might feel free to say as a student (or vice versa). But
the experience of moral choice is always the same.
The alternative to traditional legal theory, then, is to view legal theory
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as expressive rather than determinative. Legal theory cannot tell us what
to value, but it can help us (judges, scholars, citizens) make choices by
helping us to articulate what we value. I have a few words to say about
what kind of expressive theory we should be aiming for. In figuring out
what to do and how to live, we should recognize not only our active role
in shaping both our thoughts and actions, but also the social and ideologi-
cal context in which we operate. "[People] make their own history,"
Marx tells us, "but they do not make it just as they please; they do not
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circum-
stances directly found, given and transmitted from the past."11" We should
be comfortable viewing both rationality and social life as historically and
culturally situated.1 78 Viewing legal theory in this way will allow us to
exorcise the wrongful expectation that some politically neutral, ahistorical
method can generate answers to questions about what the legal rules
should be.
Moreover, we cannot respond adequately to problems faced in life by
generating abstract moral categories. Discussion of moral and legal choices
must focus on the rich context in which those problems occur. For some
purposes, it may be useful to characterize two persons as "employer" and
"employee" and to develop generalizations to describe and govern their
relationships. But it is important to remember that these are real people
we are talking about, and when we describe them in this way for the
purpose of judging what their relations should be like, we are closing our-
selves off from their actual life experiences. We can think impersonally
about a busboy as simply representing the table-clearing function; or we
can describe him, say, as a forty-year-old man, recently divorced, with
back trouble and money problems. As Robert Gordon argues, we need "to
unfreeze the world as it appears to common sense as a bunch of more or
less objectively determined social relations and to make it appear as (we
believe) it really is: people acting, imagining, rationalizing, justifying. )179
It may indeed be useful to develop general models to describe social life.
But when it comes time to make decisions, we should recognize that we
are making decisions rather than discovering ourselves. In making those
decisions, it is right to focus on the particular social context, to decide
whether our descriptive model actually applies in that case and whether
we are allowing the model to turn our attention away from facts that we
would otherwise consider to be important.
177. K. MARX, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in THE MARx-ENGELS READER
595 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1978) (1st ed. New York 1852).
178. See R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at xiv, 37.
179. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE PoLmIcs OF LAW : A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 289 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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Expressive theory emphasizes the active role of the theorist in deciding
how to characterize situations, and in deliberating, conversing, intro-
specting, and judging.8 0 Expressive theory also emphasizes the communal
nature of theory and its complex relations with social life. The kernel of
truth in the idea of rational consensus is that all ideas and actions involve
relations among people. "Individuals do not simply 'have' opinions, they
form opinions. . . The formation of opinions is not a private activity
performed by a solitary thinker."'' Traditional theorists have reified the
idea of rational consensus by treating it as a basis for what we do, as a
source of answers, as a generator of outcomes. But consensus, if it exists,
is not something that just happens to be there, that we could describe
accurately. It must be created, and the work of creating it is the work and
play of daily life, of living, contending, sharing, and being with other peo-
ple. Like law, consensus must be made, not found.'82
Emphasis on the creative, communal nature of common understanding
creates an appropriate relationship between thought and action. The proc-
ess of generating values is something we do with others in the context of
relationships that continue over time.
Democratic politics is an encounter among people with differing in-
terests, perspectives, and opinions-an encounter in which they re-
consider and mutually revise opinions and interests, both individual
and common. It happens always in a context of conflict, imperfect
knowledge, and uncertainty, but where community action is neces-
sary. The resolutions achieved are always more or less temporary,
subject to reconsideration, and rarely unanimous. What matters is
not unanimity but discourse. The substantive common interest is
only discovered or created in democratic political struggle, and it re-
mains contested as much as shared. Far from being inimical to de-
mocracy, conflict-handled in democratic ways, with openness and
persuasion-is what makes democracy work, what makes for the
mutual revision of opinions and interest.'
8 3
Legal theory can help create communal ties and shared values by freeing
us from the sense that current practices and doctrines are natural and
necessary and by suggesting new forms of expression to replace outworn
ones. For example, Gabel and Harris have suggested replacing our cur-
180. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at xiv-xv, 203; Meyerhoff, supra note 171, at 200-01.
181. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 215-16.
182. Id. at 203-04, 223-24, 229; Tushnet, supra note 10, at 826 (communities of understanding
must be created).
183. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 223-24 (quoting Pitkin & Shumer, On Participation, in 2
DEMOCRACY 43, 47-48 (1982)).
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rent rights orientation with a power orientation.184 They would shift our
focus from viewing individuals as abstract citizens whose relations to each
other are governed by rights enforced by the state to viewing them as
active participants in shaping their relations in daily life. Such changes in
language may help focus our attention on facts we had previously ignored
and make us more keenly aware of alternative social arrangements. 85
We may also use the principles and counterprinciples in traditional le-
gal theory to criticize or applaud social practice. Once we have envisioned
how we would like to do things, we can then use the principles and
counterprinciples in legal discourse to describe what we value about these
alternative arrangements. As Unger explains:
You start from the conflicts between the available ideals of social life
in your own social world or legal tradition and their flawed actual-
izations in present society. You imagine the actualizations trans-
formed, or you transform them in fact, perhaps only by extending an
ideal to some area of social life from which it had previously been
excluded. Then you revise the ideal conceptions in the light of their
new practical embodiments. You might call this process internal de-
velopment. To engage in it self-reflectively you need make only two
crucial assumptions: that no one scheme of association has conclusive
authority and that the mutual correction of abstract ideals and their
institutional realizations represents the last best hope of the standard
forms of normative controversy. 186
When judges decide cases, they should do what we all do when we face
a moral decision. We identify a limited set of alternatives; we predict the
most likely consequences of following different courses of action; we
articulate the values that are important in the context of the decision and
the ways in which they conflict with each other; we see what relevant
people (judges, scholars) have said about similar issues; we talk with our
friends; we drink enormous amounts of coffee; we choose what to do.
There is nothing mysterious about any of this. The only thing that makes
it appear mysterious is the myth that judges have an advantage that ordi-
nary citizens do not have that allows them to adjudicate value conflicts
rationally: legal reasoning. But there is really nothing about legal reason-
ing that gives judges an edge on difficult political and moral questions. All
it does is articulate in a more systematic fashion the conflicting arguments
that are generally considered relevant to political and moral questions.
184. See Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the
Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 371-72 (1982-83).
185. Id.
186. Unger, supra note 15, at 579-80.
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Judges have no better knowledge than anyone else of how to answer those
questions. Their power is legitimate only to the extent we view their deci-
sions as good and to the extent we view the current methods of choosing
judges and allowing them to adjudicate disputes as a valid alternative to
other sorts of dispute resolution and lawmaking.
It is wrong to wait around for the new Hobbes, the new Blackstone, the
new Holmes, the new Marx, the new Rawls. It is wrong to expect that
some brilliant new philosopher will come up with some grand theory that
will answer our questions of what to believe and how to live. There is
nothing to wait for. We do not need a new general theory that can by
itself both explain the rules in force and judge them. And if anyone comes
up with such a theory, we should view it with distrust. General theories
do not answer our great questions; if those theories could answer such
questions, they would not be great questions.
When we give up the idea that the legal system has a foundation, a
"rational basis," we are not left with nothing. We are left with ourselves,
and we are not nothing. As Gerald Frug notes: "The alternative to 'foun-
dations' is not 'chaos' but the joint reconstruction of social life . . . the
quest of participatory democracy."1 7 We imagine a better life in the con-
text of living with others and we work to bring it about. Whether some
imagined practice will be better or worse than current practice is a ques-
tion of moral judgment. It is not a matter of finding a foundation on
which to stand, or of finding the truth. It is a matter of conviction. We
cannot answer our question of how to live together by applying a noncon-
troversial rational method. We will have to take responsibility for making
up our minds.
VI. IMAGINATION
The gypsy wanted to stay in the village. He had been dead, but he
had returned from the other world because he could not stand the
solitude.
-Gabriel Garcia Mirquez 88
What Joel saw before him he had a terrible wish to speak out loud,
but he would have had to find names for the places of the heart and
the times for its shadowy and tragic events, and they seemed of great
magnitude, heroic and terrible and splendid, like the legends of the
mind.
-Eudora Welty"'9
187. Frug, supra note 8, at 1386.
188. G. GARCIA MARQUEZ, CiEN A os DE SOLEDAD (ONE HUNDRED YEARs OF SOLITUDE) 49
(1976) ("El gitano iba dispuesto a quedarse en eI pueblo. Habia estado en la muerte, en efecto, pero
habia regresado porque no pudo soportar la soledad.") (translation by J. Singer).
189. E. WELTY, First Love, in THE CoLLECTED STORIES OF EUDORA W'Lry 165 (1980).
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The Player and the Cards
People usually enter law school with both trepidation and eagerness.
They are eager because they believe that law has something to do with
both rationality and social justice. They come to law school filled with
deeply felt political and moral commitments, and they expect that legal
training will help them both to justify those goals and to work for them.
They are fearful because they have heard that lawyers know how to argue
for and against everything; they know how to make the weaker argument
the stronger.' 90 And indeed, they shortly learn how to argue for and
against everything, including their most profound commitments. They also
learn that torturers justify their conduct by the same kind of arguments
that they use. Moreover, the ability to argue for and against everything is
accompanied by a distressing inability to resolve the contradictions. There
are no killer arguments. And if they are thoughtful, most law students
come to feel, at some point in their education, that they are losing their
souls.
The experience I have just described is the direct result of the belief
that morality and law require rational foundations. If we feel we need to
ground our beliefs in a way that will remove all doubts, and if such a firm
ground is unavailable, we respond with either despair or apathy or cyni-
cism. This way of thinking about moral choice is a mistake. The absence
of secure foundations or decision procedures for belief should be exper-
ienced not as a void but as an opportunity. It is up to us to live in a way
that can create commitments and communities.
To make this sense of hopefulness more concrete, I thought I would end
this Article by telling you some of the things that I believe about what we
should do and how we should live. These comments are not intended to
represent a program; rather, they are general goals that describe a social
vision. l91
We should prevent cruelty. Right now, people are being dragged from
their homes, in darkness, and even in broad daylight. It is someone's
daughter, someone's son, someone's husband. They are tortured and raped
and made to endure cruel games. Then they are killed in gruesome and
inventive ways.' 92
190. Socrates was put to death for this crime. PLATO, supra note 3, at 47.
191. To speculate about institutional and legal arrangements that could actually be implemented
to achieve these goals would require the kind of contextual analysis I discussed earlier. See supra pp.
33-34, 64-67. Valid programmatic alternatives to the status quo would also have to be worked out in
the context of participatory democratic politics. For a highly detailed political program, including
recommendations for legislation, that seeks to advance this social vision, see S. BowLEs, D. GORDON,
& T. WEISSKOPF, BEYOND THE WASTELAND (1983).
192. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTImS (1984) (describing governmen-
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In some instances, the American government subsidizes the people who
commit these acts. The government reprimands the people, sternly. And
the subsidies continue."' 3
Whatever else a government does, it should not do these things. And
our government, whatever else it does, should not aid, financially or mili-
tarily, public or private organizations that routinely inflict such unbeliev-
able cruelty.
We should alleviate misery. There are people in my community, the
community where I live, where I work, who are hungry, cold, sick, home-
less. Without arguing about whether these are rights, or what sort of
rights they are, I think people should have adequate and not merely mini-
mal allotments of food, clothing, medical care, shelter. They should have
these things outright, whether they are industrious or lazy, working or
unemployed, old or young, smart or dumb. I do not know whether the
providers should be agencies of the federal government, municipalities,
courts, or communities. But these things should not be left to chance; they
should not be left to the kindness of strangers.
We should democratize illegitimate hierarchies. Too many people have
nothing to say, nothing at all, about what happens to them, day in and
day out. They take orders. This is a shame. 94 I do not know exactly how
the workplace should be organized, but it should be more subject to the
collective control of its members and less subject to the dictatorial control
of its directors.
We live in what we call a democracy, and yet we are ruled in myriad
tally institutionalized torture around the world).
193. See Nairn, Behind the Death Squads, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 1984, at cover, 20 (private
and public organizations in El Salvador, receiving substantial military, advisory and financial assis-
tance from various United States governmental agencies, are responsible for torture and murder of
thousands).
194. Many socially conscious rock musicians have portrayed the frustration of having no control
over one's daily life. See, e.g., J. COUGAR MELLENCAMP, Authority Song, UH-HUH (Copyright 1983
Riva Records, Inc.) ("I fight authority. Authority always wins."); B. SPRINGSTEFN, Factory, DARK-
NESS ON THE EDOGE OF TOWN (Copyright 1978 B. Springsteen (ASCAP)) ("End of the day, factory
whistle cries,/ Men walk through these gates with death in their eyes,/ And you just better believe,
boy,/ somebody's gonna get hurt tonight, It's the working, the working, just the working life.");
DIRE STRAITS (M. Knopfler), Telegraph Road, LOVE OVER GOLD (Copyright 1982 Chariscourt,
Ltd.) ("I used to like to go to work but they shut it down/ I've got a right to go to work but there's no
work here to be found"); THE CLASH, The Equaliser, SANDINISTA! (Copyright 1980 Nineden Lim-
ited) ("We dont want no gangboss/ We want to equalize"); B. SPRINGSTEEN, My Hometown, BORN
IN THE U.S.A. (Copyright 1984 B. Springsteen (ASCAP)) ("They're closing down the textile mill/
across the railroad tracks/ Foreman says these jobs are going boys/ and they ain't coming back to
your/ hometown"); B. SEGER, Feel Like a Number, STRANGER IN TOWN (Copyright 1977 Gear
Publishing Co. (ASCAP)) ("I take my card and I stand in line/ To make a buck I work overtime/
Dear Sir letters keep coming in the mail/ I work my back till it's racked with pain/The boss can't
even recall my name/ I show up late and I'm docked/ It never fails/ I feel like just another/ Spoke in
a great big wheel/ Like a tiny blade of grass/ In a great big field/ . . .And I feel like a number/
Feel like a number/ Feel like a stranger/ A stranger in this land/ I feel like a number/ I'm not a
number/ I'm not a number/ Dammit I'm a man/ I said I'm a man").
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ways by little and not so little tyrannies. Monarchy and aristocracy may
have gone out of fashion in 1776, but in our economic system, they are all
the rage.
The organization of daily life into a series of hierarchies prevents us
from developing genuine social connections.1"5 We are led to see each
other not as people trying to live together but as functionaries occupying
ranks within organizations, with some ranked higher than others. This
situation is further worsened by the current fairly rigid separation of work
and family life, a separation that primarily disadvantages women but that
also impoverishes men.
We need to increase the amount of collective participation in all sorts of
decisions and settings in our economic lives. The absence of such collective
processes stultifies us in our daily lives and reduces our potentially rich
and varied relationships with others to role-playing.
We should alter the social conditions that cause loneliness. Loneliness
as a quality is a bit tricky, a bit hard to define. In another mood, I would
call it alienation. But loneliness has a sharper bite to it; it is more evoca-
tive. I am thinking of Michael Walzer's description of liberalism.
For liberalism is above all a doctrine of liberation. It sets individuals
loose from religious and ethnic communities, from guilds, parishes,
neighborhoods. It abolishes all sorts of controls and agencies of con-
trol: ecclesiastical courts, cultural censorship, sumptuary laws, re-
straints on mobility, group pressure, family bonds. It creates free
men and women, tied together only by their contracts-and ruled,
when contracts fail, by a distant and powerful state. It generates a
radical individualism and then a radical competition among self-
seeking individuals."9 8
Of course, liberalism creates forms of control as well as of freedom, but
Walzer's image, with its implicit criticism, is correct.
We have separated our lives into the public realms of the market and
politics, in which we wage Hobbes' war of all against all, and the private
realms of family, friendship and religion, in which we practice coopera-
tion and community. On a small, local scale, our public lives should some-
how come to resemble our private lives more closely. I do not know how
we can accomplish this. But the loneliness of the world of the market is
wrong.1
9 7
195. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 183, at 369, 371-72; see also Coles, Hierarchy and Tran-
scendence (Book Review), 97 HARV. L. REv. 1487 (1984).
196. M. WALZER, supra note 128, at 97-98.
197. "[H]uman beings need all the relatives they can get-as possible donors or receivers not
necessarily of love, but of common decency." K. VONNEGUT, SLApsncc 5 (1976).
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We view each other with both fear and longing.198 We want mutually
satisfying relations with other people, not only at home or at church, but
in our daily lives at work. Yet we often experience those relations as
threatening. The goal of politics and law should be to organize social life
in a way that will maximize the number and variety of social situations in
which contact among people is experienced as mutually self-validating
and loving rather than mutually isolating and threatening. 9 If we indeed
view each other with a combination of fear and longing, then it seems
good and right to me that we should work to reduce the fear and satisfy
the longing.
Near the end of Winter's Tale by Mark Helprin, Mrs. Gamely reveals
to her daughter Virginia an act of kindness performed in good will toward
Virginia by a family friend. But Virginia will have none of it; the act
appears to have been futile, and Virginia asks her mother what good it
did. Mrs. Gamely replies:
"No one ever said that you would live to see the repercussions of
everything you do, or that you have guarantees, or that you are not
obliged to wander in the dark, or that everything will be proved to
you and neatly verified like something in science. Nothing is: at least
nothing that is worthwhile. I didn't bring you up only to move across
sure ground."2 0 0
Surely that is right: no guarantees-and at the same time, no passivity.
198. R. UNGER, PASSION 95-100 (1984).
199. Id. at 117-18.
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